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Corporate Taxation and BEPS: A Fair Slice for
Developing Countries?
Irene Burgers & Irma Mosquera*
Abstract
The aim of this article is to examine the differences in per-
ception of ‘fairness’ between developing and developed
countries, which influence developing countries’ willingness
to embrace the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) pro-
posals and to recommend as to how to overcome these dif-
ferences. The article provides an introduction to the back-
ground of the OECD’s BEPS initiatives (Action Plan, Low
Income Countries Report, Multilateral Framework, Inclusive
Framework) and the concerns of developing countries about
their ability to implement BEPS (Section 1); a non-exhaus-
tive overview of the shortcomings of the BEPS Project and
its Action Plan in respect of developing countries (Section
2); arguments on why developing countries might perceive
fairness in relation to corporate income taxes differently
from developed countries (Section 3); and recommendations
for international organisations, governments and academic
researchers on where fairness in respect of developing coun-
tries should be more properly addressed (Section 4).
Keywords: Fairness, international tax, legitimacy, BEPS,
developing countries
1 Introduction
1.1 OECD’s BEPS Action Plan, Low Income
Country Report, Multilateral Instrument
and Inclusive Framework
1.1.1 BEPS Action Plan
In 2013 the G20 meeting in St. Petersburg1 endorsed
the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action
Plan. In its Action Plan, the OECD calls for ‘fundamen-
tal changes to the current mechanisms and the adoption
of new consensus-based approaches, including anti-
abuse provisions, designed to prevent and counter base
erosion and profit shifting’. According to the OECD,
aggressive tax planning ‘undermines the fairness and
* Irene Burgers is Professor of International and European Tax Law, Facul-
ty of Law, and Professor of Economics of Taxation, Faculty of Business
and Economics, University of Groningen. Irma Mosquera, Ph.D. is
Senior Research Associate at the International Bureau of Fiscal Docu-
mentation IBFD and Tax Adviser Hamelink & Van den Tooren.
1. G20 Leaders Declaration meeting in St. Petersburg including the Tax
Annex to G20 leaders declaration; see <https:// www. oecd. org/ g20/
summits/ saint -petersburg/ Tax -Annex -St -Petersburg -G20 -Leaders -
Declaration. pdf> (last visited 22 March 2017).
integrity of tax systems because businesses that operate
across borders can use BEPS to gain a competitive
advantage over enterprises that operate at a domestic
level. Moreover, when taxpayers see multinational cor-
porations legally avoiding income tax, it undermines
voluntary compliance by all taxpayers.’2 Aggressive tax
planning has ‘led to a tense situation in which citizens
have become more sensitive to tax fairness issues’.3
The OECD does not provide for a definition of aggres-
sive tax planning, but it does provide a definition of
Base Erosion Profit Shifting: ‘Base erosion and profit
shifting (BEPS) refers to tax planning strategies that
exploit gaps in the architecture of the international tax
system to artificially shift profits to places where there is
little or no economic activity or taxation.’ This defini-
tion is more or less similar to what European Commis-
sion perceives as aggressive tax planning. According to
the European Commission, aggressive tax planning
‘exploits the differences in tax systems by taking advant-
age of the technicalities of a tax system or of mismatches
between two or more tax systems for the purpose of
reducing tax liability’.4 Therefore, presumably the
OECD refers to the type of tax planning that results in
BEPS.
The OECD stated that all parties, governments and
individual taxpayers are harmed including also business
since ‘fair competition is harmed by the distortions
induced by BEPS’.5 Therefore, the OECD developed
fifteen Actions including among others, actions dealing
with hybrid mismatches, limitation of interest deduc-
tions, actions recommending the introduction of CFC
rules, rules to prevent the artificial avoidance of PE sta-
tus, eliminating harmful tax regimes, dealing with tax
treaty abuse and with transfer pricing, the disclosure of
aggressive tax planning arrangements, and improvement
2. See ‘About BEPS and the inclusive framework’, <www. oecd. org/ tax/
beps -about. htm> (last visited 22 March 2017). Fairness is one of the
tax principles the OECD formulated in its Ottawa Tax Framework, as
revised in 2005 by the OECD Technical Advisory Committee (TAC). As
to the OECD, ‘this principle implies that the potential for tax evasion
and avoidance should be minimised while keeping counteracting meas-
ures proportionate to the risks involved’. OECD, Addressing the Tax
Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 – 2015 Final Report,
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (2015), at 17; see
<http:// dx. doi. org/ 10. 1787/ 9789264241046 -en> (last visited 22
March 2017).
3. OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013), at 8;
see<http:// dx. doi. org/ 10. 1787/ 9789264202719 -en> (last visited 22
March 2017).
4. The European Commission Recommendation of 6 December 2012 on
Aggressive Tax Planning C (2012)8806 Final, at 2.
5. OECD, above n. 3, at 8.
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of the mutual agreement procedure. The content of the
BEPS Actions was decided and approved by the BEPS
44 group, which includes OECD, OECD accession
countries and G20 countries.6 This article focuses on
the developing countries that are for the purpose of this
article defined as non-OECD, non-G20 countries and
are therefore not represented in the BEPS 44 group.7
1.1.2 Will BEPS Reduce Aggressive Tax Planning?
A question that, to our best knowledge, neither the
OECD nor IMF, UN or World Bank addressed, but has
been addressed in academic literature, is whether BEPS
will contribute to more economic fairness by reducing
the incentive of multinationals to use aggressive tax
planning. Martin Thomsen and Christoph Watrin
found no evidence that multinationals are more tax
aggressive than domestic firms. Their findings do not
support the need for a coordinated international tax pol-
icy to prevent base erosion nor suggest that multination-
al companies should be blamed. Thomsen and Watrin
call for governments to carefully consider the steps they
take to address the OECD’s BEPS project as well as for
future research clarifying the concept of tax avoidance
for international tax policy debates.8
6. The BRICS countries are regarded as emerging economies and even
though these countries are non-OECD countries, they have a role in
decision making by being members of the G20 and by participating on
equal footing in the BEPS 44 group. BRICS stands for Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa.
7. This article uses the distinction between developed and developing
countries to distinguish between countries members of the OECD or
G20 (developed countries) and other countries (developing countries).
This classification is useful for the purposes of this article, which is to
differentiate between OECD and G20 vs. non-OECD, non-G20 coun-
tries. This has also been the approach of the OECD when addressing
Low Income Countries in its 2014 report. However, other classifications
of countries may exist in scholarship taking into account the economic
GDP (e.g. emerging economies), the dependence on aid, and the lack
of a modernised tax administration, among others. See, for an econom-
ic approach between developed and emerging economies, the Emerg-
ing and Growth Leading Emerging Economies EAGLEs 2014 Economic
Outlook made by the BBVA (a bank) Research Unit; see <https:// www.
bbvaresearch. com/ KETD/ fbin/ mult/ 2014_ EAGLEs_ Economic_ Outllok -
Annual_ tcm348437158. pdf ?ts= 3132014> (last visited 22 March 2017).
Taking a legal perspective, Mosquera, when analysing in a 2015 publi-
cation the aggressive tax planning in South America and Sub-Saharan
Africa, has argued that no one size fits all. The author also argued that
the economic development of the countries in South America and Sub-
Saharan Africa is different among countries and among regions. In
order to find these differences, Mosquera provided a comparative anal-
ysis of the rules to deal with aggressive tax planning in South America
and Sub-Saharan African regions taking into account the country’s eco-
nomic development, tax administration capacity and resources, and the
use (or not) of domestic laws and tax treaty rules to tackle aggressive
tax planning. The author concluded that from these regions some coun-
tries may be sensitive to BEPS issues including aggressive tax planning
while for other countries aggressive tax planning is not yet the main
issue since these countries are at the early stages of developing their
own tax systems. See I.J. Mosquera Valderrama, ‘The BEPS Measures to
Deal with Aggressive Tax Planning in South America and Sub-Saharan
Africa: The Challenges Ahead’, 43 Intertax 10, at 615-27 (2015).
8. M. Thomsen and C. Watrin, Do We Really Need the BEPS Project?; see
<https:// business. illinois. edu/ accountancy/ wp -content/ uploads/ sites/
12/ 2015/ 09/ Tax -2015 -Thomsen -Watrin. pdf> (last visited 22 March
2017).
1.1.3 Low Income Countries Report Part 1 and 2
In its 2014 Report to G20 Development Working
Group on the impact of BEPS in Low Income Coun-
tries (‘2014 Report’) Part 1 and Part 2,9 the OECD iden-
tified the following differences on the basis of a ques-
tionnaire sent to developing countries, direct consulta-
tions with developing countries and the experiences of
four international organisations (IOs):
a. The nature of cross-border tax planning may differ
between developing and developed countries;
b. Developing countries may lack the necessary legisla-
tive measures needed to address BEPS;
c. Accessing relevant information is often difficult;
d. Building and maintaining capacity to implement
highly complex international rules leave room for dis-
cretion in their application;
e. Need for political impetus and support for effective
measures to counter BEPS highlighted in regional
consultations;
f. The acute pressures on developing countries to
attract investment can trigger a competitive ‘race to
the bottom’.
OECD has also mapped the following Actions that
developing countries consider as the most important for
developing countries:10
– Action 4 – Limit base erosion via interest deductions
and other financial payments;
– Action 6 – Prevent treaty abuse;
– Action 7 – Prevent the artificial avoidance of PE sta-
tus;
– Action 10 – Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are
in line with value creation – other high-risk transac-
tions;
9. In the first part of the Report, the OECD evaluates the impact of the
Action Plan in Low Income Countries and it adds other issues that
should be considered for these countries that are not included in such
action plan (e.g. use of tax incentives by developing countries). In the
second part of the Report, the OECD presents the potential actions to
assist developing countries to meet the challenges of the most relevant
actions of BEPS. OECD, Part 1 of a Report to G20 Development Work-
ing Group on the Impact of BEPS in Low Income Countries (2014); see
<https:// www. oecd. org/ g20/ topics/ taxation/ part -1 -of -report -to -g20 -
dwg -on -the -impact -of -beps -in -low -income -countries. pdf> (last visited
22 March 2017). OECD, Part 2 of a Report to G20 Development Work-
ing Group on the Impact of BEPS in Low Income Countries (2014); see
<https:// www. oecd. org/ g20/ topics/ taxation/ part -2 -of -report -to -g20 -
dwg -on -the -impact -of -beps -in -low -income -countries. pdf> (last visited
22 March 2017).
10. According to the reporters of medium importance are:
– Action 1 – Address the tax challenges of the digital economy;
– Action 5 – Counter harmful tax practices more effectively;
– Action 8 – Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with val-
ue creation – intangibles;
– Action 9 – Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with val-
ue creation – risks and capital;
– Action 12 – require taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax plan-
ning arrangements;
– Action 14 – Make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective;
and of low importance for developing countries are:
– Action 2 – Neutralise the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements;
– Action 3 – Strengthen controlled foreign company rules;
– Action 15 – Develop a multilateral instrument.
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– Action 11 – Establish methodologies to collect and
analyse data on BEPS and the actions to address it;
– Action 13 – Re-examine transfer pricing documenta-
tion.
The OECD recognises in this Report that developing
countries have other needs than developed countries in
respect of both tax design and tax administration, and
that the BEPS issues may manifest differently for devel-
oping countries given the specialties of their legal and
administrative governing framework. The OECD fur-
thermore states that a further issue for ‘developing
countries, which was raised during the regional consul-
tations, is the balance between source and residence tax-
ation embodied in bilateral tax treaties modelled on the
OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions. This is an
issue of allocating taxing rights between two treaty part-
ners. It is not a tax planning/avoidance issue and does
not give rise to BEPS.’11 Despite being outside the
scope of BEPS, the OECD stated in the 2014 Report
that ‘this is an issue of significance for many developing
countries, and that the OECD/G20 BEPS Project pro-
vides an opportunity to lay the ground for this legiti-
mate debate’.12 To the authors’ knowledge, no further
reference has been made to the fairness of the present
allocation of taxing rights between treaty partners’ allo-
cation of taxing rights in the BEPS Actions nor in the
discussion draft of the BEPS Multilateral Instrument.13
1.1.4 Multilateral Instrument
In October 2015, the OECD presented to the G20
Meeting of Finance Ministers in Lima (Peru), the final
package of the fifteen Actions for a comprehensive,
coherent and co-ordinated reform of the international
tax rules. Among these Actions, Action 15 provides for a
Multilateral Instrument.
In the discussion of this Multilateral Instrument not
only countries of the BEPS 44 group are participating
but developing countries are also participating. Devel-
oping countries have been invited to participate what
the OECD refers to as ‘on equal footing’ in this discus-
sion. The participation on equal footing by developing
countries was introduced by the OECD to address the
concerns of legitimacy and participation of developing
countries that did not belong to the BEPS 44 group. For
this purpose, the OECD set up an Ad Hoc Group to
develop the BEPS Multilateral Instrument and to
11. OECD (2014), above n. 9, at 9; see <https:// www. oecd. org/ g20/
topics/ taxation/ part -1 -of -report -to -g20 -dwg -on -the -impact -of -beps -in
-low -income -countries. pdf> (last visited 22 March 2017).
12. Ibid.
13. Neither the report on Action 15 of the BEPS Action Plan nor the Public
Discussion draft mention the allocation of taxing rights. See OECD,
Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties,
Action 15 – 2015 Final Report (2015); see <http:// dx. doi. org/ 10. 1787/
9789264241688 -en> (last visited 22 March 2017) and OECD, Public
Discussion Draft BEPS Action 15: Development of a Multilateral Instru-
ment to Implement the Tax Treaty Related BEPS Measures (2016); see
<www. oecd. org/ tax/ treaties/ BEPS -Discussion -draft -Multilateral -
Instrument. pdf> (last visited 22 March 2017).
address mainly Actions 2, 6, 7 and 14.14 This Ad Hoc
Group includes more than hundred countries (OECD
and G20 countries, developing countries), as well as a
number of non-State jurisdictions and international
organizations participating as Observers.15 This Multi-
lateral Instrument has been adopted in the meeting on
24-25 November 2016.16
1.1.5 Inclusive Framework
In the Meeting in Kyoto, Japan (29 June 2016-1 July
2016) the OECD presented an inclusive framework for
the implementation of BEPS. This Inclusive Frame-
work allows countries and jurisdictions outside the
BEPS 44 group to participate as BEPS Associates on the
implementation of BEPS. The BEPS Project and its
Inclusive Framework contains four minimum standards
Actions 5,17 6,18 1319 and 1420 that should be implemen-
ted into the tax system of the countries participating in
this framework. The other Actions (1-4 and 7-12) com-
prise recommendations and best practices for countries
to implement. At the time of writing this article, more
than ninety countries are participating in the BEPS
Inclusive Framework.21
1.1.6 Problems of Legitimacy
The current developments on the BEPS project show
that not only the countries that are members of the
BEPS 44 group, but also developing countries are par-
ticipating in the discussion of the BEPS Multilateral
Instrument and as BEPS Associates in the Inclusive
Framework to implement BEPS Actions.
Against this background, the authors argue that the par-
ticipation on equal footing of developing countries in
the BEPS Multilateral Instrument and the Inclusive
Framework are not sufficient to legitimise the role of the
OECD and the BEPS 44 group in setting international
tax standards for developing countries. The reason is
that there has not been a true decision-making process
14. These actions deal with hybrid mismatches, treaty abuse, permanent
establishment and mutual agreement procedure. According to the
OECD, the negotiation in the ad hoc Group was focused on how the
Convention would need to modify the provisions of bilateral or regional
tax agreements in order to implement those measures. See OECD, A
Mandate for the Development of a Multilateral Instrument on Tax
Treaty Measures to Tackle BEPS, Action 15 – 2015 (2015); see <www.
oecd. org/ ctp/ beps -action -15 -mandate -for -development -of -multilateral
-instrument. pdf> (last visited 22 March 2017).
See explanatory statement to the multilateral instrument <https:// www.
oecd. org/ tax/ treaties/ explanatory -statement -multilateral -convention -to
-implement -tax -treaty -related -measures -to -prevent -BEPS. pdf> (last vis-
ited 22 March 2017).
15. See <www. oecd. org/ tax/ treaties/ multilateral -instrument -for -beps -tax -
treaty -measures -the -ad -hoc -group. htm> (last visited 22 March 2017).
16. See <www. oecd. org/ tax/ countries -adopt -multilateral -convention -to -
close -tax -treaty -loopholes -and -improve -functioning -of -international -tax
-system. htm> (last visited 22 March 2017).
17. Countering Harmful Tax Practices more effectively, taking into account
transparency and substance.
18. Preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstan-
ces.
19. Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country by Country Reporting.
20. Making Dispute Resolutions more Effective.
21. See <www. oecd. org/ tax/ beps/ inclusive -framework -on -beps -composi
tion. pdf> (last visited 22 March 2017).
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since the content of BEPS Actions has been decided by
the BEPS 44 group with developing countries having
only a consultative role. The analysis of legitimacy and
participation of developing countries has been made by
Mosquera elsewhere.22
1.1.7 Why Are Developing Countries Participating in the
BEPS-Project?
Despite the problems of legitimacy and the different
needs of developing countries, developing countries
such as Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Bangladesh,
Eritrea, Sri Lanka and Pakistan amongst others are par-
ticipating in the inclusive framework to implement
BEPS.23 It is not clear why these developing countries
are participating in BEPS. To the authors’ best knowl-
edge, no research is available on this issue. Some indica-
tion of the reason that these countries are participating
in BEPS could be found in their need to receive techni-
cal assistance and to gain more specialised knowledge on
transfer pricing.24 These have been some of the con-
cerns addressed by developing countries in the ques-
tionnaire on BEPS issues developed by the UN Sub-
committee on BEPS for developing countries. The
response to this questionnaire was limited since only
four developing countries replied (Tonga, Lesotho,
Ghana and Zambia).25 Surprisingly enough, these four
countries are not participating in the inclusive frame-
work for reasons that have not yet been investigated.
Research on the reasons why countries have adopted
BEPS is outside the scope of this article; this article
focuses on the different perspective of fairness between
developing and developed countries. Further research is
recommended on the motivation of developing coun-
tries to participate in BEPS and the specific problems in
the implementation of BEPS in developing countries.
22. I.J. Mosquera Valderrama, ‘Legitimacy and the Making of International
Tax Law: The Challenges of Multilateralism’, 7 World Tax Journal 3,
343, at 382 (2015).
23. See <www. oecd. org/ tax/ beps/ inclusive -framework -on -beps -composi
tion. pdf> (last visited 22 March 2017).
24. M. Moore, H.O. Fjeldstad, J. Isaksen, O. Lundstøl, R. McCluskey & W.
Prichard, ‘Building Tax Capacity in Developing Countries’, 96 IDS Policy
Briefing, Institute of Development Studies (2015).
25. The UN has addressed the BEPS issues from the perspective of develop-
ing countries. For this purpose, a questionnaire on BEPS issues was
made available also including background papers drafted by legal schol-
ars regarding specific topics. The responses to the questionnaire by
developing countries were limited since only Lesotho, Ghana, Tonga
and Zambia provided short answers to the questionnaire. Two of the
main issues that these countries addressed were the implementation of
domestic rules and the administrative capacity. In respect of implemen-
tation of domestic rules the countries mentioned the introduction of
guidelines to apply the arm’s length principle in transfer pricing (Tonga);
implementation of tax avoidance rules (Zambia); lack of database to
conduct the comparability analysis in respect of transfer pricing (Gha-
na); to prevent the tailoring of activities by multinationals so that such
activities will not be deemed to constitute a permanent establishment in
the developing country (Zambia). In respect of administrative capacity,
Lesotho made reference to the limited skills to audit some of the highly
specialised sectors. See Valderrama (2015), above n. 7, 615, at 619.
1.1.8 Concerns of Developing Countries on Lack of
Technical Resources
As mentioned in the OECD’s Low Income Report, the
lack of technical resources, personnel capacity, technical
knowledge and economic means of developing countries
constitutes a challenge for these countries to implement
measures concerning international assistance. This most
likely is also the case for the BEPS Multilateral Instru-
ment and the BEPS four minimum standards and to
achieve outcomes favourable to them.
In September 2016, in a regional meeting of the inclu-
sive framework of BEPS for non-OECD countries in
Latin America and the Caribbean, some participant
countries expressed their ‘concerns on the consequences
derived from not being able to partially or fully imple-
ment the BEPS measures contemplated in the inclusive
framework, considering their own priorities and specific
countries’ features’.26 In addition, in November 2016, in
a regional meeting of the inclusive framework of BEPS
in African French speaking (non-OECD) countries, the
participating countries expressed their need for capacity
building and training.27 These countries also highligh-
ted the importance of finding out the costs and benefits
that the implementation of BEPS Actions will cause in
their domestic revenue and the need of these countries
to maintain some of their preferential tax regimes in
order to attract investment.28 Furthermore, these coun-
tries asked for more flexibility in the time schedule and
on the methodology to be used to implement the BEPS
minimum standards.29 If the BEPS Inclusive Frame-
work does not take into account these shortcomings, the
consequences will be a partial implementation of BEPS
or an implementation of BEPS in theory but in practice
a lack of commitment to the BEPS.
1.1.9 Different Perspectives on Fairness
Different perspectives on fairness between developed
and developing countries will influence the implementa-
tion of the BEPS Actions including the BEPS Multilat-
eral instrument. In light of the BEPS Project as well as
the need of developing countries to raise revenue to ach-
26. Regional meeting of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS for Latin America
& the Caribbean. Montevideo, Uruguay, 21-23 September 2016. Co-
chair summary, at 3; see <www. oecd. org/ tax/ beps/ beps -regional -
meeting -co -chairs -summary -lac -september -2016 -montevideo. pdf> (last
visited 22 March 2017).
27. OECD and CREDAF hold regional meeting of the Inclusive Framework
on BEPS for francophone countries; see <www. oecd. org/ ctp/ oecd -holds
-regional -meeting -of -the -inclusive -framework -on -beps -for -francophone
-countries. htm> (last visited 22 March 2017).
28. Chair summary 4; see <https:// www. oecd. org/ fr/ fiscalite/ beps/ resume -
co -presidents -reunion -regionale -du -cadre -inclusif -beps -tunis -2016. pdf>
(last visited 22 March 2017).
29. Ibid. Chair summary conclusion.
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ieve the SDGs,30 this article aims to provide a discus-
sion of the concept of fairness in respect of developing
and developed countries implementing the BEPS
Actions. This article aims to answer the following ques-
tions: Is the perception of fairness between developing
countries and developed countries the same or different?
And if different, what, if anything, can be done to a-
chieve fairness for both developed and developing coun-
tries?
This article does not aim to provide a definition of fair-
ness.31 The focus of this article is on the approach to
fairness from an international perspective, i.e. fairness
between the states. Whether and how the BEPS Project
and Action Plan will contribute to fairness from the per-
spective of justice in the BEPS 44 group and in develop-
ing countries that are participating as BEPS Associates
in the BEPS Inclusive Framework is not clear. To our
best knowledge, no research report on this issue is avail-
able.
1.1.10 Structure and Limitations
We first address the shortcomings of the BEPS project
in respect of developing countries addressed by tax
scholars and by international organisations (Section 2).
Thereafter, we offer some arguments on why develop-
ing countries might perceive fairness in relation to cor-
porate income taxes differently from developed coun-
tries (Section 3). Subsequently, we provide some exam-
ples of policy issues where the issue of fairness should
be addressed more profoundly and in a broader context
on the international BEPS-agenda than thus far, where
the OECD’s and EU’s focus was on achieving a level
playing field and voluntary compliance (Section 4).
30. In their Global Framework for Financing Development Post-2015 Pro-
gram the Heads of State and Government and High Representatives
gathered in Addis Abba from 13 to 16 July 2015 recognised ‘that signif-
icant additional domestic public resources, supplemented by interna-
tional assistance as appropriate, will be critical to realizing sustainable
development and achieve the SDGs’. Furthermore, they committed to
‘enhance revenue administration through modernised, progressive tax
systems, improved tax policy and more efficient tax collection’; and to
‘work on improving the fairness, transparency, efficiency and effective-
ness of their tax systems, including by broadening the tax base and
continuing efforts to integrate the informal sector into the formal econ-
omy in line with country circumstances’; see <www. un. org/ esa/ ffd/
ffd3/ wp -content/ uploads/ sites/ 2/ 2015/ 07/ Addis -Ababa -Action -
Agenda -Draft -Outcome -Document -7 -July -2015. pdf> (last visited 22
March 2017).
At the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit on 25 Septem-
ber 2015, world leaders adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, which includes a set of 17 Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) to end poverty, fight inequality and injustice, and tackle
climate change by 2030; see <www. undp. org/ content/ undp/ en/ home/
sdgoverview/ post -2015 -development -agenda. html> (last visited 22
March 2017).
31. Fairness from a conceptual and an institutional perspective will be the
subject of another article from these authors. See ‘Fairness: A Dire Inter-
national Tax Standard with No Meaning?’ (forthcoming).
2 Shortcomings of BEPS in
Respect of Developed and
Developing Countries
2.1 Introduction
Are the BEPS Actions truly the best option for creating
a level playing field for and voluntary compliance by
their companies? Some developed countries have
expressed their concerns and have decided to act unilat-
erally by introducing their own rules. An example of the
former is the United States where the Congress has
expressed concern in the negotiation of a BEPS Multi-
lateral Instrument, stating that ‘regardless of what the
Treasury Department agrees to as part of the BEPS
project, Congress will craft the tax rules that it believes
work best for U.S. companies and the U.S. economy’.32
The latter has been the case in Australia and the United
Kingdom, two countries that have decided to introduce
their own (domestic) rules to deal with shifting of prof-
its by multinationals (i.e. diverted profit tax). The intro-
duction of these unilateral measures shows the lack of
commitment to the consensual approach of BEPS.
Australia’s and the United Kingdom’s unilateral initia-
tives have received criticism from the Director of the
OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy, stating that ‘what is
clear is that without coherent, global approaches, prob-
lems like those that gave rise to BEPS are likely to arise
again – it is the mismatches and gaps between national
tax systems, along with the international rules, that have
facilitated these types of tax planning arrangements and
allow the location of taxation to be separated from the
underlying economic activity. To effectively maintain
their tax sovereignty in a globalised world, governments
can no longer just consider their domestic system if they
want their tax policies to be effective.’33 To the authors’
knowledge, no other country has introduced similar tax-
es.34
In this context, the question that should be asked is if
these developed countries (members of the OECD and
of the G20) have concerns on the likeliness that the
BEPS proposals will be accepted and/or whether these
32. Letter of the Senate Finance Committee (Chairman Orrin G. Hatch) and
House Ways and Means Committee (Chairman Paul D. Ryan) to the
Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew of 9 June 2015; see <https:// www.
finance. senate. gov/ chairmans -news/ hatch -ryan -call -on -treasury -to -
engage -congress -on -oecd -international -tax -project> (last visited 22
March 2017).
33. Interview to OECD Pascal Saint-Amans March 2016; see <https://
taxlinked. net/ blog/ march -2016/ beps -oecd -pascal -saint -amans -answers
-questions>.
34. However, another tax that could also have issues of fairness is the
recently (2016) proposed Equalization Levy to impose tax on specific
digital transactions. This levy aims to allocate a ‘fair share’ on the tax of
the income obtained in digital transactions. It is not yet clear whether
this Equalization Levy will be approved by the Legislative and if it will
survive the constitutional challenge in India. It is also not clear how the
tax treaties will provide relief to this levy since this levy does not form
part of the Indian Income Tax Act of 1961. See, for an analysis of this
levy, S. Wagh, ‘The Taxation of Digital Transactions in India: The New
Equalization Levy’, 70 Bulletin for International Taxation 9 (2016).
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proposals will be effective. As rightly stated by Ostwald,
the question is ‘who will adopt the BEPS after all?’35
In respect of developing countries that were outside the
BEPS 44 Group and therefore did not participate in the
decision-making process of the BEPS Action, this ques-
tion is even more valid. Will developing countries adopt
BEPS? And if so, how will the shortcomings of BEPS
agenda and Actions in respect of developing countries
be solved?
The development of a multilateral instrument and the
introduction of an inclusive framework for the imple-
mentation of BEPS calls for the OECD and G20 to
address the shortcomings of BEPS in respect of devel-
oping countries. These shortcomings are addressed in
the following paragraphs. In Section 4 we provide some
thoughts for further research on the fairness of BEPS
vis-à-vis developing countries.
2.2 Different Needs Identified by the Four IOs
and Scholars
2.2.1 Different Needs of Developing Countries Identified
by the Four IOs
As has been mentioned, the OECD recognises in its
Report to G20 Developing Working Group on the
Impact of BEPS in Low Income Countries that devel-
oping countries have other needs than developed coun-
tries in respect of both tax design and tax administra-
tion, and that the BEPS issues may manifest differently
for developing countries given the specialties of their
legal and administrative governing framework. Specific
concerns that have been identified in the OECD’s ques-
tionnaire and consultations and the IOs’ experiences are:
Tax loss on indirect transfer of assets; Lack of data for
transfer pricing comparability analyses; Wasteful tax
incentives that erode the tax base; and capacity develop-
ment issues involving international assistance providers.
Amongst others, IMF, UN and World Bank addressed
these issues.36
In 2014, the IMF published a Policy Paper on the Spill-
overs in International Corporate Taxation.37 In that
paper, the IMF addressed the issue of tax incentives as
one of the reasons for corporate tax spillover being the
impact that one country’s international tax practice has
on other countries. The IMF stated that for developing
countries, the key issues are preventing tax treaty shop-
ping, indirect transfer of interest in assets, interest
deductibility and the introduction of clear and simpli-
fied transfer pricing rules.38
In July 2015, following the invitation of the G20’s
Development Working Group the IMF, the OECD, the
UN and the WB published a report with options for
low-income countries’ effective and efficient use of tax
35. T.P. Ostwal, ‘Who Will Adopt the OECD’s Plan against BEPS, after
All?’, Kluwer International Tax Blog (2015); see <http:// tpostwal. in/
downloads/ OECDs. pdf> (last visited 22 March 2017).
36. As acknowledged in OECD (2014), above n. 9, at 20.
37. IMF Policy Paper Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, 9 May 2014.
38. Ibid., at 24.
incentives for investment.39 This report provided rec-
ommendation on how support for developing tax
capacity in developing countries can be improved. This
report also identified other problems of developing
countries, which include non-BEPS issues, that may
result in tax base erosion or may reduce compliance.
These problems are besides the use of tax incentives, the
lack of technical and administrative capacity, and cor-
ruption. Some problems can be solved by means of
technical assistance but others will need the political will
for instance to tackle corruption, and to reduce or con-
trol the excessive use or length of tax incentives by
developing countries.
This shows that international organisations are aware of
the fact that the needs of developing countries are to
some extent different from those of developing coun-
tries, as reflected in the OECD’s Addressing the impact
of BEPS in Low Income Countries Report (2014) and
also argued by IMF (2014) and the July 2015 Report.
Developing countries feel the scope of the BEPS discus-
sion should be broadened to the use of tax incentives,
the allocation of tax treaty rights in accordance with res-
idence and source, the tax treaty costs/benefits analysis
to be made for the negotiation of tax treaties, the finding
of comparables for the application of transfer pricing
rules and the limited administrative capacity of tax
administration.
2.2.2 Needs of Developing Countries Identified by
Scholars
Scholars also pointed out the differences in needs
between developed and developing countries.
Wagenaar has rightly argued that some of the BEPS
problems may not be relevant for developing countries
and that, therefore, ‘the proposed solutions could also
have unexpected results in tax systems’.40 Wagenaar
referred to specific issues in developing countries such
as tax holidays, tax exemptions, reliance on source-
based taxation, use of deemed profit regimes and the
legal restrictions on activities by foreign investors that
may restrict ‘foreign companies to operate and structure
transactions in certain ways’.41
This concern has also been shared by Oguttu in a two-
part article regarding the analysis of BEPS Actions from
39. ‘Options for Low Income Countries’ Effective and Efficient Use of Tax
Incentives for Investment’. A report to the G-20 Development Working
Group by the IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank (September 2015), at
23; see <https:// www. imf. org/ external/ np/ g20/ pdf/ 101515a. pdf>
(last visited 22 March 2017).
40. L. Wagenaar, ‘The Effect of the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
Action Plan on Developing Countries’, 69 Bulletin for International
Taxation 2, 84, at 86 (2015).
41. For instance, Wagenaar explains that the ‘setting up activities often
requires business licences that restrictively list the activities that can be
performed by the foreign investor. In addition, there may be obligations
to register or get approval for any cross-border contracts that have
been entered into by local subsidiaries. Extracting cash from operation
companies may require special approvals under foreign exchange con-
trol or more general rules controlling foreign investment’. Ibid., at 87.
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an African perspective.42 For Oguttu, ‘protecting the tax
base of African countries involves adopting relevant
provisions in their domestic laws and in the tax treaties
that they conclude and, at the same time, being aware of
the special needs and perspectives of the country in
question, such as the state of development of the tax
system and its administrative capacity’.43 According to
Oguttu, the Actions that are important for African
countries are – in line with the OECD’s findings for its
Low Income Report – Action 4, 6, 7, 10 and 13, and,
remarkably different from the OECD’s findings, not 11
but 12.44
In another article Oguttu addressed the problems in the
implementation of the mutual agreement procedure,
MAP (Action 14) and the role of the competent authori-
ties (CA) in African countries. Oguttu argued that the
OECD ‘has issued a number of documents providing
guidance regarding the effectiveness of MAPs’. Howev-
er, the OECD’s recommendations often favour the
OECD member countries, which may not take into
account the interests and administrative constraints of
developing countries’. Therefore, Oguttu recommends
that in line with international guidance on effective
MAPs that has been provided by the minimum stan-
dards set out in the Final Report on Action 14 and the
UN Guide on MAPs for developing countries, African
countries should publish clear guidelines and proce-
dures to access MAPs that clearly specify the circum-
stances in which MAPs will be applied, the time limits
in which taxpayers can approach the CAs, who is the
CA, what documentation is required to be submitted
with the application for a MAP, the interaction of
MAPs with domestic legislation and estimated time-
lines.45
Lennard46 refers to the tension between source- and res-
idence-based taxation on one hand, and the importance
42. A.W. Oguttu, ‘OECD’s Action Plan on Tax Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting: Part 1 – What Should Be Africa’s Response?’, 69 Bulletin Inter-
national Taxation 11 (2015) and see A.W. Oguttu, ‘OECD’s Action
Plan on Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: Part 2 – A Critique of
Some Priority OECD Actions from an African Perspective – Addressing
Excessive Interest Deductions, Treaty Abuse and the Avoidance of the
Status of a Permanent Establishment’, 70 Bulletin International Taxa-
tion 6 (2016).
43. Ibid.
44. Dealing respectively with limit base erosion via interest deductions and
other financial payments, prevent treaty abuse, prevent artificial avoid-
ance of permanent establishment, transfer pricing, disclosure of aggres-
sive tax planning and transfer pricing documentation.
45. For developing countries, more specifically African countries, this author
states that ‘African countries need to ensure that MAPs function effec-
tively, and that MAPS are transparent and accessible to taxpayers. Afri-
can tax administrations should set aside funds to train their staff regard-
ing MAPs. They should also be more active in supporting taxpayers
who apply for MAPs and should not try to influence taxpayers to give
up their right to MAPs, and taxpayers should not be prohibited, as part
of settlement negotiations with tax administrations, from claiming the
full amount of tax suffered in exchange for not proceeding with a
MAP’. A.W. Oguttu, ‘Resolving Treaty Disputes: The Challenges of
Mutual Agreement Procedures with a Special Focus on Issues for Devel-
oping Countries in Africa’, 70 Bulletin for International Taxation 12
(2016).
46. M. Lennard, ‘Base Erosion and Profit Shifting and Developing Country
Tax Administrations’, 44 Intertax 10, at 745 (2016).
of withholding taxes to many countries on the other, but
also the issues it raises for taxpayers. As to Mosquera for
developing countries, issues that should be addressed,
which are not BEPS-related issues, are ‘the transparen-
cy in respect of the extractive industry, the consequen-
ces of the repeal of tax incentives in respect of the bilat-
eral investment treaties, the training required for tax
treaty negotiations, and the usefulness (or not) of a mul-
tilateral instrument to modify tax treaties for countries
that are at the early stages of concluding tax treaties’.47
Burgers et al. discussed the fact that BEPS issues may
not be similar in developing countries as in developed
countries and recommends developing countries to take
notice of the way tax systems of developed countries
have been exploited by taxpayers, among others, in
structuring their finance, as well as of the anti-abuse
measures that countries with more advanced tax systems
have included in their tax systems; to identify to which
extent their tax systems might be exploited in a similar
way; and to decide on measures to counteract such
abuse.48 The following paragraphs will provide our view
on the problems regarding the implementation of the
BEPS Actions in developing countries.
2.3 BEPS Actions and Developing Countries
2.3.1 Introduction
The above overview shows that international organisa-
tions and tax scholars have concerns regarding whether
all BEPS Actions are relevant for developing countries,
and on the feasibility of implementing BEPS Actions in
developing countries. In this section, we provide our
view on the relevance of BEPS Actions for developing
countries.49 This description is by no means exhaustive.
The focus is on the four BEPS Actions (5, 6, 13 and 14)
regarded as minimum standards with some succinct ref-
erence to the other BEPS Actions. Further research is
recommended on the feasibility of the implementation
of the BEPS Actions considering the differences in tax
systems and tax cultures of countries around the world
47. See Valderrama (2015), above n. 22, 381, at 382.
48. I.J.J. Burgers, J.N. Bouwman, N.J. Schutte & A.J. van Herwaarden, ‘Pay
your taxes where you add the value: how to avoid tax avoidance and
abuse? An overview of measures taken and proposed with a special
focus on developing countries’. Paper presented at Pay your taxes
where you add the value, The Hague, The Netherlands, 2015: 1-61; see
<www. rug. nl/ research/ portal/ files/ 22877769/ Pay_ your_ taxes_ where_
you_ add_ the_ valuetaxavoidance2900 615def. pdf !null> (last visited 22
March 2017).
49. This analysis does not address Action 15, the BEPS Multilateral Instru-
ment. For a discussion on the BEPS multilateral instrument, see R. Gar-
cía Antón, ‘The 21st Century Multilateralism in International Taxation:
The Emperor’s New Clothes?’, 8 World Tax Journal (2016); and see N.
Bravo, ‘The Multilateral Tax Instrument and Its Relationship with Tax
Treaties’, 8 World Tax Journal 3 (2016); see also I. Grinberg, ‘The New
International Tax Diplomacy’, 104 Georgetown Law Journal 1137, at
1196 (2016).
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and the different problems felt by developing and devel-
oped countries.50
2.3.2 Implementation Problems
The lack of legitimacy in respect of the participation of
developing countries in the agenda setting and the con-
tent of the BEPS Actions may also have an influence on
the implementation of the BEPS Actions in developing
countries. This has also been pointed out by Lennard51
stating that ‘even for countries that have not been
directly involved in the BEPS process there are aspects
of it which may have generally positive domestic and
international impacts. However, direct developing
country involvement in the decision making process by
countries that are neither OECD Members nor G20
countries has been very limited, and there is suspicion
among many countries that their engagement on imple-
mentation is more zealously sought than their participa-
tion in setting the rules, and that those rules may not
sufficiently reflect developing countries realities and
priorities.’52
The BEPS Inclusive Framework has introduced four
BEPS Actions as minimum standards that countries
participating in this Framework will be required to
implement. A peer review system has been introduced
to review the legal and tax framework and the imple-
mentation of these minimum standards in these coun-
tries.53 These minimum standards are Actions 5, 6, 13
and 14 dealing respectively with eliminating harmful tax
regimes, tax treaty abuse, country-by-country reporting
requirements, and improvement of the mutual agree-
ment procedure. In our view, developing countries will
benefit from all these four Standards. However, for
these Actions to be effective, we suggest these Actions
should be tailored to developing countries and the prob-
lems in the implementation of these standards will need
to be further analysed. Below we provide for a short
overview of some of these implementation problems.
50. The differences in tax systems and tax cultures have been addressed in
the past by tax scholars considering that the legal transplant of concepts
may result in different outcomes due to the differences in tax systems
and tax cultures in countries around the world. See C. Gabarino, ‘Com-
parative Taxation and Legal Theory: The Tax Design Case of the Trans-
plant of General Anti-Avoidance Rules’, 11 Theoretical Inquiries in Law
2 (2010); see also I.J.J. Burgers, ‘Some Thoughts on Further Refinement
of the Concept of Place of Effective Management for Tax Treaty Purpo-
ses’, 35 Intertax 6/7, 378, at 386 (2016); and see I.J. Mosquera, ‘The
Interaction of Tax Systems and Tax Cultures in an International Legal
Order for Taxation’, 5 Diritto e Pratica Tributaria Internazionale 2,
CEDAM, Italy, 841, at 869 (2008); and see I.J. Mosquera, Leasing and
Legal Culture – Towards Consistent behavior in Tax Treatment in Civil
Law and Common Law Jurisdictions, at 352 (2007).
51. Michael Lennard is Chief International Tax Cooperation, United
Nations.
52. M. Lennard, ‘Base Erosion and Profit Shifting and Developing Country
Tax Administrations’, 44 Intertax 10, 744, at 745 (2016).
53. The OECD has announced that the first standard that will be reviewed
and monitored will be Action 14; see <www. oecd. org/ tax/ beps/ beps -
action -14 -peer -review -and -monitoring. htm> (last visited 22 March
2016).
Action 5: Preferential Regimes Needed to Attract Invest-
ment
Action 5 deals with preferential tax regimes that can be
qualified as harmful. However, countries need to have
preferential tax regimes to attract investment and the
question is how these harmful tax regimes will be evalu-
ated, and how this evaluation can be detrimental to
developing countries’ own tax and investment policy.
This concern has been expressed by French African
speaking countries addressed in the regional BEPS
Inclusive Framework meeting of November 2016 (see
Section 1).
Action 5 and 13 Exchange of Business Information: Tech-
nical Capacity Problems
Action 5 and Action 13 introduce exchange of business
information, the technical capacity of developing coun-
tries and the protection of confidentiality will also need
to be evaluated. Action 5 introduces compulsory sponta-
neous exchange on rulings related to preferential tax
regime. Action 13 deals with transfer pricing documen-
tation that provides for exchange of documentation such
as master file, local file and country-by-country reports
among countries. The question that arises is how the
confidentiality of the business and taxpayer information
exchange in these Actions will be protected in develop-
ing and developed countries.54 Will developed countries
introduce safeguards to limit the exchange with coun-
tries that do not have the same level of protection of tax-
payer information as the developed country? The prob-
lems of automatic exchange of information should be
addressed taking into account that due to the fast pace
in which automatic exchange of information ‘is going to
take place, the result may be less control over the accu-
racy and use of the information by the receiving and
supplying authorities’.55
Action 6 Tax Treaty Abuse: Technical Capacity Problems
Another Action that may be difficult for developing
countries to implement is Action 6, which deals with tax
treaty abuse. The problems may arise due to the limited
technical capacity of developing countries to implement
the limitation on benefits rule and/or the principal pur-
pose test. Uncertainty of how tax administrations will
interpret the new rules is another issue that is probably
more prominent in developing countries than in devel-
oped countries.
Action 14 Peer Review of Mutual Agreement: Lack of
(Meaningful) MAP-Rules
The final minimum standard to be implemented is
Action 14 dealing with mutual agreement procedure.
The terms of reference for the peer review has identified
four key areas: preventing disputes, availability and
access to MAP, resolution of MAP cases, and imple-
54. See also F. Debelva and I.J. Mosquera, ‘Privacy and Confidentiality in
Exchange of Information Procedures: Some Uncertainties, Many Issues,
But Few Solutions’, Intertax, forthcoming May 2017.
55. See Valderrama (2015), above n. 22, 371, at 377.
36
ELR August 2017 | No. 1 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000077
This article from Erasmus Law Review is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (RUG)
mentation of MAP agreements.56 The schedule of peer
review has been already published and the peer review
of the first batch of countries will start on December
2016.57 Interesting in this schedule is that the peer
review for most of the developing countries has been
deferred until 2020.58 The reason for this deferral is sta-
ted in the terms of reference: ‘the MAP Forum should
defer the review of any such member that is a develop-
ing country and is not an OECD or G20 country if that
member has not yet encountered meaningful levels of
MAP requests and there is no feedback from other
members of the FTA MAP Forum indicating that the
jurisdiction’s MAP regime requires improvement’.59
This statement acknowledges the lack of MAP rules in
developing countries. Surprisingly enough, the terms of
reference do not refer to the UN guidelines on mutual
agreement procedure, which can be used by developing
countries to introduce MAP rules.60 The question is
whether the terms of reference will take into account the
technical and administrative constrains of developing
countries to introduce MAP rules and to provide an
effective solution to tax disputes by means of the MAP.
This concern has been also highlighted by Oguttu when
addressing the problems in the implementation of MAP
rules in African countries (Section 2.2.2).
Other BEPS Actions
Other BEPS Actions, i.e. 1-4 and 7-12, are regarded as
best practices and recommendations. Due to the space
constraint in this article, below we only briefly address
the implementation of these Actions in developing
countries. In our view, Actions 7 (permanent establish-
ment) and Actions 8-10 (transfer pricing) are more rele-
vant for developing countries.
Action 1 and 4 (respectively digital economy and limita-
tion on interest deductions) can be dealt with in domes-
tic law by levying a tax on digital services or by means of
specific targeted anti-avoidance rule in combination
with a general anti-avoidance rule. However, we feel, for
level playing field reasons, it would be best if all coun-
tries introduce more or less similar rules. The different
views on equality and certainty discussed in Section 3.2
56. Terms of reference available at the OECD website; see <www. oecd. org/
tax/ beps/ beps -action -14 -on -more -effective -dispute -resolution -peer -
review -documents. pdf>.
57. These countries are Belgium, Canada, The Netherlands, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
58. The countries for which peer review has been deferred until 2020 are
Benin, Costa Rica, Egypt, Gabon, Georgia, Jamaica, Kenya, Pakistan,
Paraguay, Senegal, Seychelles, Uruguay; see <https:// www. oecd. org/
tax/ beps/ beps -action -14 -peer -review -assessment -schedule. pdf>.
59. OECD, BEPS Action 14 on More Effective Dispute Resolution Mecha-
nisms – Peer Review Documents, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting Project (2016), at 20; see <www. oecd. org/ tax/ beps/ beps -
action -14 -on -more -effective -dispute -resolution -peer -review -
documents. pdf>.
60. See, on the use of these guidelines for African countries, Oguttu; see
<www. un. org/ esa/ ffd/ tax/ gmap/ Guide_ MAP. pdf> (last visited 22
March 2017).
will also be relevant for the implementation of these
Actions.61
In respect of the implementation of Actions 2 and 3
(respectively hybrid mismatches and controlled foreign
corporation rules) we feel the perception of developing
countries expressed in the OECD’s Low Income Coun-
tries Report Part 1 requires international governance
actions in raising the awareness that the use of hybrid
mismatches etc. is a global phenomenon.
Action 11, Measuring and Monitoring, BEPS Report,
shows that the quantitative analyses of BEPS are severe-
ly constrained by limitations of the currently available
data. Even the tax data directly controlled by govern-
ments is often not made public in a form useful for anal-
ysis. Limited government capacity for analysing the data
already collected by tax authorities was demonstrated by
the fact that only eight out of thirty-seven OECD Mem-
ber States surveyed by the OECD could report the total
amount of tax revenue collected from MNEs in their
jurisdictions. Capacity problems as mentioned above are
a main concern for developing countries, the reason why
it is safe to state that developing countries will perceive
even more problems with measuring BEPS than devel-
oped countries.62
2.4 Inclusiveness and Multilateralism of BEPS
2.4.1 Is BEPS Really Inclusive Providing for
Participation on ‘Equal Footing’?
Developing countries’ ‘participation on equal footing’ in
the discussion of the BEPS Multilateral Instrument and
as BEPS Associate in the Inclusive Framework for
implementation of BEPS raises the question as to
whether the BEPS is inclusive or not.
The OECD seems to be aware of the importance of
including developing countries in the discussion on the
implementation of BEPS for legitimacy purposes. The
OECD reports that, until the release of the BEPS Pack-
age in October 2015, approximately 60 developing
countries have participated directly or indirectly in the
process through regional consultations and thematic
global Fora. Despite this participation, developing
61. E.g. JinYan Li in her paper ‘Protecting the Tax Base in the Digital Econo-
my’ written at the request of the UN. She points out the digital econo-
my poses two kinds of challenges to the tax base of developing coun-
tries: base erosion due to BEPS strategies; and base cyberization due to
the dematerialisation and connectivity features of the digital economy.
According to Li, developing countries may need to develop their own
measures, such as the taxation of services and royalties, as developing
countries, being market countries, tend to be ‘net losers’ in tax revenue.
Li calls for coordination between the UN and the OECD, as the special
concerns of the developing countries may not be shared by the OECD.
A. Trepelkov, H. Tonino & D. Halka, United Nations Handbook on Pro-
tecting the Taks Base of Developing Countries (2015) 3; see <www. un.
org/ esa/ ffd/ wp -content/ uploads/ 2015/ 07/ handbook -tb. pdf> (last vis-
ited 22 March 2017). For the participation and representation of devel-
oping countries and the role of the UN see R.S. Avi-Yonah and H. Xu,
‘Evaluating BEPS’, University of Michigan Public Law Research Paper
No. 493 (15 January 2016); see <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 2716125>
(last visited 22 March 2017) (discussed in Section 2.3 hereafter).
62. OECD, Measuring and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11 – 2015 Final Report
(2015), at 37; see <http:// dx. doi. org/ 10. 1787/ 9789264241343 -en>
(last visited 22 March 2017).
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countries did not have a decision-making role in the set-
ting of the BEPS agenda nor in the content of the BEPS
Actions. The decision-making process was at the hand
of the BEPS 44 group, and of course developing coun-
tries did not participate, nor were represented, in setting
the agenda and in the decision-making process of the
BEPS Action Plan that resulted in the 5 October BEPS
final package.63 Following concerns of legitimacy, the
OECD wanted to change this by introducing the partic-
ipation on equal footing (thus also decision making) in
the BEPS Multilateral Instrument (more than 100 coun-
tries including the BEPS 44 group) and in the BEPS
Inclusive Framework (90 countries including the BEPS
44 group).
Although the OECD refers to the participation as being
on ‘equal footing’, given developing countries are late-
comers in the discussion, they have little capacity and
probably also less knowledge on the topic than devel-
oped countries that this gives a too optimistic view of
reality. Moreover, the participation in the discussion of
the multilateral instrument and in the inclusive frame-
work will not solve the problem of the lack of participa-
tion of developing countries in the setting of the agenda
and the content of the BEPS Actions. The OECD’s and
other international organisations’ acknowledgment of
the different objectives demonstrates that even though
the OECD and other international organizations are
aware of the differences, these differences did not result
in a tailor-made Action Plan for developing countries
nor in specific caveats or options in the BEPS Actions to
be applicable to developing countries.
This is more important if we are to consider the BEPS
multilateral instrument, which modifies bilateral tax
treaties around the world.64 Even though there is con-
sensus for a multilateral agreement, as rightly stated by
Eicke it is not clear whether the time will be right and
‘how many compromises and mini package deals will be
necessary to achieve an agreement that does not sacrifice
the higher goals’.65 The BEPS multilateral instrument
adopted in November 2016 confirms this statement
since it provides several options for countries to adopt
for instance in respect of the method to prevent double
taxation in hybrid mismatches and on the content of the
63. See Valderrama (2015), above n. 22, 371, at 377.
64. The explanatory statement explains the way that the bilateral and
regional tax treaties will be modified with the BEPS Multilateral instru-
ment stating that ‘The Convention operates to modify tax treaties
between two or more Parties to the Convention. It will not function in
the same way as an amending protocol to a single existing treaty, which
would directly amend the text of the Covered Tax Agreement; instead,
it will be applied alongside existing tax treaties, modifying their applica-
tion in order to implement the BEPS measures. As a result, while for
internal purposes, some Parties may develop consolidated versions of
their Covered Tax Agreements as modified by the Convention, doing so
is not a prerequisite for the application of the Convention. As noted
below, it is possible for Contracting Jurisdictions to agree subsequently
to different modifications to their Covered Tax Agreement than those
foreseen in the Convention’.
65. R. Eicke, ‘A BEPS Multilateral Instrument – Practical Solution or Elusive
Pipe Dream?’, Tax Notes International (2014), at 528.
provision dealing with treaty abuse.66 Countries will be
required to revisit their tax treaties to find out which
country will introduce which option, and then to start
making the changes accordingly. This requires tax tech-
nical knowledge and treaty negotiation skills since the
implementation of the option will need to be discussed
in the domestic ratification procedure as well as with the
other treaty partner.67
2.4.2 Should the UN Take Leadership?
The limited inclusiveness and participation of develop-
ing countries in the BEPS project have been argued by
Reuven Avi-Yonah and Haiyan Xu referring to: (i) the
OECD countries dominating the discussion and nego-
tiations; (ii) (at the time) only 60 countries participating
in the BEPS discussions in contrast to the UN repre-
senting 193 countries); (iii) there is no evidence that the
proposals of developing countries that where consulted
regarding the BEPS Action Plan were accepted; (iv) the
limited influence of developing countries due to the
limited experience and resources to enforce the BEPS
Actions; and (v) the process of public debate and con-
sulting being insufficient and without transparency
since no publication has been made on the reasons for
rejecting different proposals. Therefore, as to these
authors the UN should take the leadership since the UN
is ‘more qualified, impartial, transparent, credible and
influential than the OECD/G20 in rewriting and reno-
vating the international tax rules including the BEPS
counter-measures’.68
66. See text of the Multilateral Instrument Arts. 3-7 (Hybrid mismatches)
and 7 (treaty abuse). The text of the BEPS Multilateral Instrument is
available at the OECD Website; see <www. oecd. org/ tax/ treaties/
multilateral -convention -to -implement -tax -treaty -related -measures -to -
prevent -BEPS. pdf.
67. The Explanatory Statements states that para. 4 of Art. 29 Time Notifica-
tions ‘provides that if notifications are not made at the time of signa-
ture, a provision al list of expected notifications shall be provided to the
Depositary at that time. This provisional list is for transparency purposes
only and is intended to give other Signatories a preliminary indication of
the Signatory’s intended position. This takes account of the nature of
the Convention which will operate to modify existing bilateral or multi-
lateral relationships and the options chosen by the other Contracting
Jurisdictions will determine the way in which the existing bilateral or
multilateral agreement is modified. Accordingly, provisional indications
of intended positions are important to allow an understanding of the
likely changes to an existing tax agreement and to facilitate domestic
ratification procedures as well as to prepare for the implementation of
the modifications made by the Convention. The provisional list of
expected notifications under Art. 29(4) does not restrict the ability of
that Signatory to submit a modified list of notifications upon deposit of
the instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval’, at 73; see
<www. oecd. org/ tax/ treaties/ explanatory -statement -multilateral -
convention -to -implement -tax -treaty -related -measures -to -prevent -BEPS.
pdf>.
68. Avi-Yonah and Xu, above n. 61, at 27-28.
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The Civil Society Forum69 and the 134 members of the
G77 group of developing countries70 proposed to give to
the UN Tax Committee the status of an intergovern-
mental body both at the July 2015 Addis Ababa Confer-
ence and the July 2016 Nairobi Conference.71 The Civil
Society Forum advocated for a forum where every
country can participate, not just the richest. The Civil
Society Forum stated in the declaration that ‘a key rea-
son why the global tax system has failed is that more
than half of the world’s countries are currently excluded
from the decision-making process on global tax stan-
dards”. Therefore, the Civil Society Forum stressed
that ‘we need to fundamentally change the tax rules, and
not having every country represented in writing those
rules to make sure they work for everyone is not only
undemocratic but also unfair’.72 The G77 developing
countries called, as a precondition, for more cooperation
in international tax matters ‘a more inclusive mode of
discussion and a seat at the table in the policy decision
making on financing for development’.73
Despite these arguments, the proposals were rejected.
Developed countries decided not to give the upgrade to
the UN Committee since in their opinion the OECD
has a leading role in all tax issues. Therefore, it is sub-
mitted that the work of the UN Committee as a repre-
sentative of developing countries will be limited due to
the predominant role of the OECD. Another reason is
also the UN Committee’s lack of resources to engage
permanent staff to carry out tax research and/or to
69. According to its website, an open forum for people to engage with the
challenges of building a world where all can flourish; see <http://
civilsocietyforum. com/ > (last visited 22 March 2017).
70. A group of, at the date of establishment (15 June 1964), 77 and pres-
ently 134 developing countries providing the means for the developing
world to articulate and promote its collective economic interests and
enhance its joint negotiating capacity on all major international eco-
nomic issues in the United Nations system, and promote economic and
technical cooperation among developing countries; see <http://
schemaroot. org/ region/ international/ government/ united_ nations/
group_ of_ 77/ > (last visited 22 March 2017).
71. 14th session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD 14) in Nairobi; see <www. ipsnews. net/ 2016/ 08/ developing -
nations -seek -tax -body -to -curb -illicit -financial -flows/ > (last visited 22
March 2017).
72. In its declaration form, the Addis Ababa Civil Society Forum on Financ-
ing for Development of 12 July 2015, the Civil Society states: ‘We reit-
erate the need and strongly recommend the establishment of an inter-
governmental, transparent, accountable, adequately resourced tax body
with universal membership that leads global deliberations on interna-
tional tax cooperation. Such a body will strengthen the ability of devel-
oping countries to generate significant sustainable financing for devel-
opment through, for example, combating corporate tax dodging in
developing countries and balancing the allocation of taxing rights
between source and residence countries. It should also support the
efforts of peoples in developing countries to develop their own progres-
sive, rights-based, equitable tax systems and laws, free of such pres-
sures imposed by lenders and developed country governments’, at 4;
see <www. icae2. org/ images/ Addis%20Ababa%20CSO%20FfD
%20Forum%20Declaration%20 -%2012%20July%202015. pdf> (last
visited 22 March 2017).
73. UN News Centre, 14 July 2015: UN Negotiations resume on financing
framework to advance global development; see <https:// www.
theguardian. com/ global -development -professionals -network/ 2015/ jul/
15/ addis -ababa -talks -risk -deadlock -over -un -agency -for -tax -ffd3 -
financing -for -development> (last visited 22 March 2017).
advise developing countries.74 Notwithstanding these
problems, in our view the UN should have a more pre-
dominant role and international institutions and the
OECD, IMF and World Bank should facilitate this role.
The initiative of writing Joint Reports is a first step in
this direction, that will not only give the UN a more
prominent role, but will also contribute to mutual
understanding. Our recommendation is provided in
Section 4.
2.5 Tax Cooperation vs. Tax Competition
The reason why developing countries are participating
in the BEPS project even though its content has been
decided by the BEPS 44 group is not clear, but perhaps
some indication could be found, for instance, in the
need of countries to receive technical assistance and to
gain more specialised knowledge on transfer pricing.
The motivation for cooperation between states can also
be found in the concept of global justice of Nagel,75
where the transformed role of the state has been
addressed.76 Nagel discusses the problem of how global
justice can be achieved. He argues that ‘global justice
requires global sovereignty’ and that ‘the most likely
path toward some version of global justice is through
the creation of potentially unjust and illegitimate global
structures of power that are tolerable to the interests of
the most powerful current nation-states’. These effec-
tive but illegitimate institutions, to which the standards
of justice apply, will first increase injustice.
For Dagan – referring to Nagel – the questions that
should be asked in international tax and the achievement
of global justice are: ‘if states’ coercive power is eroding
due to competition and if they now find it difficult to
treat their citizens justly, what, if anything, can be done
to promote justice? Can we still expect states to uphold
principles of justice even if they can no longer do so uni-
laterally? Can we expect them to cooperate in order to
ensure justice? And if they have to rely on the coopera-
tion of other states in order to sustain their sovereign
power, does this give rise to a new level of justice duties,
across state boundaries?’77 In this context, Dagan
addresses the shortcoming of the current BEPS Project
in the promotion of global justice, which has ‘not cen-
tered on considerations of justice but, rather, on ways to
improve states’ ability to collect taxes in light of increas-
ing tax competition’, reason why a new way to promote
cooperation with justice for all states should be promo-
ted.78
For developing countries, the fundamental question is
whether in order to raise revenue the solution is interna-
74. This is illustrated by the fact that only one person is permanent staff of
the UN Tax Committee, i.e. Michael Lennard. The other participants are
members of an Ad Hoc Committee. For an overview of the Committee
see <www. un. org/ esa/ ffd/ tax/ overview. htm> (last visited 22 March
2017).
75. T. Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, 33 Philosophy & Public
Affairs 2, at 113 and 120 (2005).
76. Ibid., at 146-47.
77. T. Dagan, ‘International Tax and Global Justice’, SSRN (2016), at 24;
see <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 2762110> (last visited 22 March 2017).
78. Ibid.
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tional tax cooperation and the implementation of BEPS
Actions or rather to have tax competition by introducing
incentives to attract investment? To answer this ques-
tion and to give a voice to developing countries, the
World Bank organised in May 2016 the Conference:
‘Winning the Tax Wars: Global Solutions for Develop-
ing Countries.’79 In respect of corporate taxation,80 the
discussion in this conference addressed philosophical
(and political) questions concerning fair and effective
taxation from an international perspective. The World
Bank states that: ‘the global tax agenda has mainly
focused on these issues from the fiscal revenue genera-
tion perspective (tax base erosion and tax rate “race to
the bottom”) and efficiency viewpoint (uncertainty of
tax regimes for foreign direct investment and long term
profitability of firms). Less attention has been given to
how these tax trends are affecting developing countries
and who the winners/losers are at the global level.’81
The topics discussed in this conference were, among
others, tax competition, tax cooperation and transparen-
cy from the perspective of developing countries, also
including questions such as (i) how tax competition
affects particularly the ability of developing countries to
enforce a legitimate contract between government and
taxpayer; (ii) how global tax rules could be improved to
keep pace with a rapidly changing global business envi-
ronment; (iii) whether tax competition is needed; and
(iv) whether tax cooperation including possible regional
and global arrangements is necessary. The debate on
these topics has been made available in the World Bank
website and it is clear that the World Bank wants to take
a leading role in the debate regarding developing coun-
tries.82 However, it is not yet clear how the findings of
this conference will result in concrete proposals for
developing countries.
How for instance should the new international regime
for exchange of information be accommodated to the
needs of developing countries? According to Urinov, a
closer study of the global standard, its adoption process
and the recent practice indicate that the initiative on
automatic exchange of information are intended to
establish a platform for regular flow of information
mainly between tax havens and some developed coun-
tries. It, by and large, ignores the developing countries’
participation in the new regime. Urinov warns that in
fact, some strict requirements of the standard would
79. Program of the conference; see <www. worldbank. org/ en/ events/ 2016/
04/ 29/ winning -the -tax -wars -global -solutions -for -developing -
countries#2.
80. Other topics also discussed are taxing to promote public goods, tobacco
taxes, taxing to promote public goods, carbon taxes.
81. Invitation to the conference available at the website of the World Bank;
see <www. worldbank. org/ en/ events/ 2016/ 04/ 29/ winning -the -tax -
wars -global -solutions -for -developing -countries#1>.
82. See <http:// live. worldbank. org/ winning -the -tax -wars> (last visited 22
March 2017).
prevent most developing countries from joining the
regime anytime soon.83
2.6 Intermediate Conclusion
In Section 2 we have addressed the shortcoming of
BEPS in respect of developing countries. Scholars have
addressed mainly the different problems of developing
countries, which are not all BEPS-related problems (e.g.
tax incentives), the lack of participation and representa-
tion of developing countries in the decision-making pro-
cess of the BEPS Actions, and the limited participation
of the UN in the BEPS discussions. International
organisations such as the IMF, UN and WB have also
addressed the importance to help developing countries
to strengthen their tax systems and to achieve Sustaina-
ble Development Goals (SDGs), to tackle corruption
and to give a voice to developing countries, including
small countries, into the debate on international policy.
Another problem that has been identified by scholars
and international organisations is the allocation of taxing
rights between developing and developed countries.
The OECD has stated in the 2014 Report that the allo-
cation of taxing rights between countries is outside the
scope of BEPS.84 However, in our view and as rightly
argued in legal scholarship,85 this issue should be also in
the BEPS Agenda since only a comprehensive discus-
sion will contribute to achieving fairness in the BEPS
discussion in respect of developing countries.
We submit that the implementation of BEPS will
require more than the options provided in the Multilat-
eral Instrument. Tailored solutions should be intro-
duced for developing countries, taking into account the
lack of technical resources (personnel capacity, technical
knowledge and economic means) of developing coun-
tries. As rightly argued by Bird, the need for tailored
solutions in tax policy also ‘emphasizes the extent to
which sustainable reforms must be developed “in
house” by countries themselves’.86 Thus, more resour-
ces, more time and more tailored solutions are needed
for developing countries.
83. V. Urinov, ‘Developing Country Perspectives on Automatic Exchange of
Tax Information’, 1 Law, Social Justice & Global Development Journal
(2015), Warwick School of Law Research Paper; see <http:// papers.
ssrn. com/ sol3/ papers. cfm ?abstract_ id= 2684111> (last visited 22 March
2016).
84. OECD (2014), above n. 9, at 1 and 9; see <https:// www. oecd. org/ g20/
topics/ taxation/ part -1 -of -report -to -g20 -dwg -on -the -impact -of -beps -in
-low -income -countries. pdf> (last visited 22 March 2017).
85. E.g. M. Lennard, ‘Base Erosion and Profit Shifting and Developing
Country Tax Administrations’, 44 Intertax 10, at 745 (2016); and see
S.B. Law, ‘Base Erosion Profit Shifting – An Action Plan for Developing
Countries EPS’, 68 Bulletin for International Taxation 1 (2014); see also
Y. Brauner, ‘BEPS: An Interim Evaluation’, 6 World Tax J, at 10-39
(2014).
86. R. Bird, ‘Taxation and Development: What Have We Learned from Fifty
Years of Research?’, DIIS Working Paper International Development
Studies (2013); see <https:// www. ids. ac. uk/ files/ dmfile/ Wp427. pdf>
(last visited 22 March 2017).
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3 Arguments Why Developing
Countries Might Perceive




In a 2003 World Bank publication, Richard M. Bird and
Eric M. Zolt mapped arguments why fairness concerns
in developing countries may be different from those in
developed countries in respect of individual income tax-
es, wealth taxes and consumption.87
There is some evidence that developing countries per-
ceive differently from developed countries the fairness
in relation to corporate income taxes as well. In the fol-
lowing we give a few examples of likely differences in
perception of fairness between developing and devel-
oped countries. These examples will be given in accord-
87. Their main arguments were:
– developing countries are less capable of using the tax system to
redistribute income as income and wealth taxes play a relatively
small role in the tax structure of developing countries and individual
income taxes are merely a wage withholding tax;
– care must be taken not to complicate individual income taxes;
– it is likely that the consequences of using individual income taxes for
influencing economic behaviour are different in developing coun-
tries than in developed countries (work vs. leisure, formal vs. grey/
black economy, saving at home vs. portfolio investment outside the
country);
– personal income taxes in developing countries should have a
‘threshold’ well above average income levels;
– the most effective way to reduce inequality in many countries seems
likely to be through spending programs targeted at the poor.
Most likely these arguments are still valid. R.M. Bird and E.M. Zolt,
‘Introduction to Tax Policy Design and Development’, World Bank, at
21-23; see <www. gsdrc. org/ document -library/ introduction -to -tax -
policy -design -and -development/ > (last visited 22 March 2017).
88. Public finance scholars traditionally have defined fairness in terms of
horizontal and vertical equity (the quality of being fair and impartial).
Horizontal equity is defined by Musgrave and Kaplow as the require-
ment that equals be treated alike and both define vertical equity as
requiring an ‘appropriate’ pattern of differentiation among unequals.
See R.A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (1959), at 160; L.
Kaplow, ‘Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle’, 2
National Tax Journal (Discussion Paper No. 8 5/85, Harvard Law
School), at 139 (1989); see <www. law. harvard. edu/ programs/ olin_
center/ papers/ pdf/ Kaplow_ 8. pdf> (last visited 22 March 2017); quoted
by J.R. Repetti and P.R. McDaniel, ‘Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The
Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange’, 10 Florida Tax Review 1 (1993), at
607-22; see <http:// lawdigitalcommons. bc. edu/ cgi/ viewcontent. cgi ?
article= 1706& context= lsfp> (last visited 22 March 2017).
ance with the economic88 approach to fairness and the
juridical89 approach fairness.
3.1 Differences in Economic Perspective to
Fairness
3.1.1 Higher Dependency on CIT as Source of Revenue
Developing countries may perceive fair corporate
income taxes from an economic perspective as defined
by Adam Smith in his Maxim of Equality (subjects of
every State should contribute in proportion to the reve-
nue which they enjoy under the protection of the State)
differently from developed countries for several rea-
sons.90 First, the corporate income tax (CIT) as percent-
age of GDP in developing countries is much higher than
in developed countries, to wit 10% of GDP, where it
has been a constant 3% of GDP in the period 1980-2016
in developed countries despite a sharp fall in statutory
tax rates from on average 50%-25% in this period.
Therefore, developing countries may be for instance
more sensitive to BEPS and, as the OECD rightly
remarks, given ‘developing countries’ greater reliance on
CIT revenues, the impact of BEPS on these countries is
particularly damaging’.91
89. Tax scholars are using the concept of fairness as justice to restrict the
behaviour of the taxpayer by claiming the moral duty of the taxpayer to
pay their fair share. Some tax scholars have addressed the concept of
fairness in respect of the role of the citizen (taxpayer) in a political com-
munity. The approach of tax scholars results in fairness between tax-
payers who should abstain from engaging in aggressive tax planning.
However, one of the drawbacks is that the concept of fairness is used
without having a proper definition of what is fairness and how fairness
can be achieved. The consequence is that fairness in taxation is a blur-
red concept that may also, from a juridical perspective, have different
meanings. S.J.C. Hemels, ‘Chapter 18: Fairness: A Legal Principle in EU
Tax Law?’, in C. Brokelind (ed.), Principles of Law: Function, Status and
Impact in EU Tax Law (2014); See also S.J.C. Hemels, ‘Fairness and
Taxation in a Globalized World’ (2015); see <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract=
2570750> (last visited 22 March 2017). See also J.L.M. Gribnau and
A.G. Jallai, ‘Good Tax Governance and Transparency. A Matter of Ethi-
cal Motivation’, 6 Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Ser-
ies (2016). See also R. Happé, ‘Fiscale ethiek voor multinationals’, 144
Weekblad fiscaal recht 7108 (2015), at 944 and 953. See also R.
Happé, ‘Belastingethiek: een kwestie van fair share’, Belastingen en
ethiek, 243 Geschriften van de Vereniging voor Belastingwetenschap
(2011), at 3-69 and 52-53.
90. In his famous ‘Wealth of Nations’ Adam Smith formulated the following
four Maxims (also referred to as Canons) of Taxation that are necessary
for a fair tax system: Maxim of Equality, Maxim of Certainty, Maxim of
Convenience and Maxim of Economy. See A. Smith, An Inquiry into the
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1904); see <www. econlib.
org/ library/ Smith/ smWN21. html> (last visited 22 March 2017). See
also T. Seth, Canons of Taxation Enunciated by Adam Smith – Dis-
cussed! (1948); see <www. economicsdiscussion. net/ taxes/ canons -of -
taxation -enunciated -by -adam -smith -discussed/ 1948> (last visited 22
March 2017).
91. Press release. First meeting of the new inclusive framework to tackle
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting marks a new era in international tax co-
operation; see <www. oecd. org/ ctp/ first -meeting -of -the -new -inclusive -
framework -to -tackle -base -erosion -and -profit -shifting -marks -a -new -era
-in -international -tax -co -operation. htm>. ‘Given developing countries’
greater reliance on CIT revenues, the impact of BEPS on these countries
is particularly damaging’.
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3.1.2 Higher Dependency on Tax Incentives as a Method
to Attract Investment
Tax incentives play a more important role in attracting
foreign capital than in developed countries. Instead of a
race to the bottom in terms of CIT-rates, in developing
countries what IMF authors S.M. Ali Abbas and
Klemm refer to as partial race to the bottom takes place,
where rates have fallen to almost zero due to these tax
incentives.92 Although States intentionally provide these
tax incentives, one may wonder whether Adam Smith’s
Maxim of Equality is upheld by such tax systems.
Moreover, in developing countries the widespread
exemptions are often provided in non-transparent ways
and with a high degree of discretion.93 Nevertheless,
developing countries may perceive their system as being
fair, at it is perceived as the only way to be competitive.
3.1.3 Different Views on Level Playing Field for the
Digital and the Traditional Economy
Developing countries have other views on what is fair
than developed countries. An example is the corporate
income tax rates applied to the digital economy referred
to by World Bank president Jim Yong Kim.94 The
OECD and EU call for a level playing field for the digi-
tal economy and the traditional economy. Developing
countries apparently feel it is fair to let the digital sector
contribute more than the traditional economy because,
perhaps in line with Adam Smith’s argument for fair-
ness from an economic perspective, they feel this sector
of the economy has a greater ability to pay than the tra-
ditional economy, that is, in Adam Smith’s perception,
‘in proportion to the revenue which they respectively
enjoy under the protection of the state’. We could not
trace any evidence that this sector indeed has such
greater ability to pay, and that this sector is able to
receive a larger benefit under the protection of the state
than the traditional economy. More research on this
issue is needed.
92. S.M. Ali Abbas and A. Klemm, ‘Partial Race to the Bottom; Corporate
Tax Developments in Emerging and Developing Economies’; see
<https:// ideas. repec. org/ p/ imf/ imfwpa/ 12 -28. html> (last visited 22
March 2017). The authors assembled a data set on corporate income
tax regimes in fifty emerging and developing economies over
1996-2007 and analysed their impact on corporate tax revenues and
domestic and foreign investment.
93. A. Jewell, M. Mansour, P. Mitra & C. Sdralevich, IMF Staff Discussion,
‘Fair Taxation in the Middle East and North Africa’ (2015); see <https://
www. imf. org/ external/ pubs/ ft/ sdn/ 2015/ sdn1516. pdf> (last visited 22
March 2017).
94. In respect of fair taxation, the World Bank furthermore is concerned
with the fact that governments in many developing countries have
taxed the ICT sector at rates significantly higher than other services.
World Bank president Jim Yong Kim remarked at the World Bank–IMF
Spring Meeting 2016 that one of the three possible ways for Ministers
of Finance to contribute to the ‘Global Connect Initiative’s target of 1.5
billion people added to the internet by 2020’ is ‘Fair taxation of the tel-
ecom sector’. ‘Governments need to ensure more reasonable and pre-
dictable tax levels’. Remarks by World Bank President Jim Yong Kim at
the Global Connect Initiative, World Bank-IMF Spring Meetings 2016;
see <www. worldbank. org/ en/ news/ speech/ 2016/ 04/ 14/ remarks -by -
world -bank -group -president -jim -yong -kim -at -the -global -connect -
initiative>.
3.1.4 Different Views on Allocation of Taxation Rights
Developing countries also have different views on the
allocation of taxation rights on business profits. The
UN for example did not amend its Model Tax Treaty in
line with the new Article 7 OECD. The underlying rea-
son may be fear of loss of revenue as well as fear of com-
plicating the allocation of profits to PEs, if not only
internal dealings are part of a transaction with a third
party (sales of goods, delivery of services to third party,
but all internal dealings including internal loans and
internal disposal of know-how) should be rewarded
arm’s length.
In respect of transfer pricing, developing countries
stress the importance of simplicity (the so-called sixth
method, which is used in a number of developing coun-
tries).95 The problems in the implementation of BEPS
Actions related to transfer pricing have been also poin-
ted out by Espinel taking into account the Colombian
experience. Even though Colombia as one of the OECD
accession countries has adopted the BEPS Action Plan,
the implementation of BEPS Transfer Pricing Actions
8-10 does not ‘seem practical or achievable in the short
term’. Transfer Pricing Legislation was introduced in
the 2004 Tax Reform and substantially amended in the
2012 Tax Reform. Therefore, as rightly argued by Espi-
nel, if a ‘country has just finished understanding and/or
implementing a transfer pricing regime, how can such a
country now begin implementing the outcome of the
BEPS initiative? What is in it for them?’96 The answer is
adopting the proposed measures will result in more rev-
enue, but the problem will be that the application of
transfer pricing rules will result in more disputes not
only affecting the multinationals but also countries.
Espinel rightly states that ‘disputes are now affecting
not only MNEs, but also countries themselves, as tax
that is not paid in one jurisdiction is paid in the other’.97
This concern is more important now since the allocation
of taxing rights between residence and source has been
left outside the scope of BEPS. Developing countries
need to have a competitive treaty network if they are to
implement all BEPS proposals and at the same time
95. See, for the Sixth Method, OECD, ‘Transfer Pricing Comparability Data
and Developing Countries’ (2014); and M.G. Malla and A. Carrera,
‘Commodities Transfer Pricing: Revisiting the Sixth Method in Latin
America’, 25 Transfer Pricing Report 422 (2016).
96. M.I. Espinel Coral, ‘BEPS Initiative in Colombia: Transfer Pricing for the
Modern World’, 23 International Transfer Pricing Journal 4, at 318-22
(2016).
97. Ibid., at 322.
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want to be able to attract foreign investment.98 Further-
more, as rightly stated by Wagenaar, restriction of treaty
access for instance by introducing the LOB or PPT
clause can give ‘rise to both domestic and treaty policy
questions for developing countries, which should recon-
sider the appropriate level of taxation on investors from
non-treaty states. In the longer run, these countries
should consider obtaining similar benefits for local busi-
ness by expanding their treaty network’.99
3.1.5 Different Views about Fair Tax Systems and Fair
and Efficient Tax Administrations
In response to the recognition that BEPS is a global
problem, the African Tax Administration Forum
(ATAF) organised a Consultative Conference on New
Rules of the Global Tax Agenda in Johannesburg, on 18
and 19 March 2014. In its Discussion Paper entitled
‘The Global Tax Agenda and Its Implications for Afri-
ca’,100 ATAF stated that ‘in developing countries,
beyond its fiscal role, the tax system has a more substan-
tive role: it is an important tool for good governance and
the basis for the social fiscal contract between govern-
ments and its citizens and corporations. Tax revenues
are vital to finance their development agenda and the
redistribution of incomes, thus contributing the poverty
alleviation. In a context where the recent global financial
crisis has reduced the importance of official develop-
ment assistance (ODA) as a reliable source for financing
post-2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
developing countries are beginning to realise that the
achievement of the MDGs and economic goals (i.e. mar-
ket reforms, promotion of private sector investment,
industrialisation and promotion of regional programmes
and development, etc.) will depend heavily on domestic
tax revenues. Consequently, creating robust and equi-
table domestic tax policies and implementing a fair and
effective international tax system through international
cooperation become primordial.’
ATAF is also concerned about a fair tax design and fair
tax administrations, as is reflected in a Joint Statement
on Cooperation between the African Development Bank
and the African Tax Administration Forum: ‘Convinced
that taxation is essential to sustainable development, and
that all sectors of society should work together to pro-
mote fair and efficient tax systems and administrations
98. In general, developing countries are depending on withholding taxes on
royalties, interest, and technical services whereas in the international tax
policy of developed countries these withholding tax rates are low or
zero. In some developed countries (e.g. the Netherlands) withholding
taxes on royalties, interest, and technical services even do not exist. If
there are developing countries with no tax treaty network, and the
BEPS proposals were to be universally adopted, ‘companies in such
countries would most likely fall back on domestic law of the source
countries’. In developing countries, withholding tax can be relatively
high and without any treaty applicable, international groups may leave
to other countries with treaty network that can provide a reduced with-
holding tax rate or no withholding tax rate. Therefore, Wagenaar
argues that developing countries should have a treaty network. Wage-
naar (2015), above n. 40, at Section 3.5.
99. Ibid., at Section 4.
100. Discussion Paper available at the website of the African Tax Research
Network; see <atrnafrica. org/ atrn/ documents/ download/ 8>.
that will ensure that each country receives the fruits of
its own economic achievement and, at the same time,
improves its overall governance’.
The concerns of ATAF are important since these type
of organisations are one of the three pillars101 of the
OECD in translating the BEPS Action Plan into practi-
cal support for lower capacity developing countries.
ATAF’s concerns in the context of ‘The Global Tax
Agenda and its implications for Africa’ show the BEPS
Multilateral instrument and the BEPS Inclusive Frame-
work should ensure that each country including devel-
oping country benefits from BEPS by raising more rev-
enue, acquiring more technical expertise or by receiving
a part of the revenue that the other country has obtained
in part due to the efforts of the country.
3.2 Differences in Juridical Perspective to
Fairness
3.2.1 Equality: Groups of Companies
One of the issues of fairness from a juridical perspective
is equality. Developing countries may have different
ideas about equality compared to developed countries in
respect of the design of CIT law, especially where it
concerns groups of companies. Like many other devel-
oping countries, Tanzania, for example, abolished the
participation exemption in Section 54(2) of the Income
Tax Act 2004 as from July 2012, as it was considered
not fair that contracts were not respected. Tanzania for
the same reason does not have a group treatment
regime.102
Developing countries generally also have other percep-
tions on the juridical fairness of withholding taxes, not
in the least also for the economic reason that withhold-
ing taxes are simple and reliable sources of revenue.
Often developing countries have high withholding taxes
on all three sources of passive income (dividend, interest
and royalties). An exception is Colombia, a country that
does not levy dividend withholding tax at the time of
writing (November 2016). The Colombian government
proposed in its 2012 Tax Reform Bill introduction of a
4% tax on dividends. There was opposition from differ-
ent interest business groups and legislators in the Con-
gress to this proposal. The business associations argued
that the dividend withholding tax would unfairly ‘con-
stitute double taxation, first on corporations and again
101. According to the OECD these three main pillars are: (1) the direct par-
ticipation of developing countries and of Regional Tax Organisations in
the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD and all technical working
groups; (2) the set-up of Regional Networks of tax policy and adminis-
tration officials on BEPS in five regions to ensure the participation of
countries that are not able to regularly attend the Paris-based meetings;
(3) capacity building support, including the development of toolkits, to
assist countries implement solutions to tackle BEPS; see <www. oecd.
org/ ctp/ beps -frequentlyaskedquestions. htm> (last visited 22 March
2017).
102. See W.A. Mgimwa, ‘Speech by the Minister for Finance Introducing to
the National Assembly the Estimates of Government Revenue and
Expenditure for the Fiscal year 2012/2013’, at 60; see <www. mof. go.
tz/ mofdocs/ msemaji/ Budget%20english%202013. pdf> (last visited 22
March 2017).
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on shareholders’.103 The tax reform submitted to the
Colombian Congress in October 2016104 contains a pro-
posal for a dividend withholding tax.105 Due to the pre-
vious antecedents in the Colombian Congress regarding
the fairness for companies of this tax, it is not yet clear
whether this dividend withholding tax will be approved
by the Congress.
3.2.2 Equal Treatment/Non-Discrimination
Courts of developed and developing countries may have
different views on the interpretation of Article 26 Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well
as on the non-discrimination provisions in tax treaties.
For example, the Dutch Supreme Court in its applica-
tion of this article tests whether:
– the legislation causes unequal treatment;
– there is no objective and reasonable justification for
the unequal treatment.
Moreover, the Dutch Supreme Court applies a quanti-
tative threshold.106 Generally, in these non-discrimina-
tion cases this Supreme Court not only interprets Arti-
cle 26 ICCPR, but also Article 14 jo. Article 1 Protocol
European Convention on Human Rights. Generally, the
Dutch Supreme Court rules that budgetary problems
are no justification for the unequal treatment. However,
in its decision of 29 January 2016, V-N 2016/7.17,107
the Supreme Court ruled that taking into account the
acute revenue problems resulting from the economic
crisis and the incidental character of the rule in question
(a crisis levy on ‘high wage employees’) and the specific
circumstances of the taxpayer did not fail to strike a fair
balance between the interest of the taxpayer in question
and the state.
103. G.A. Flores-Macias, ‘Chapter 3 The Political Economy of Colombia’s
2012 and 2014 Fiscal Reforms’, in J.E. Mahon Jr, M. Bergman & C. Arn-
son (eds.), Progressive Tax Reform and Equality in Latin America, Wil-
son Center, at 101-27. Specific reference to the role of business associa-




104. Reuters, ‘Colombia Tax Reform to Go to Congress in October: Presi-
dent’; see <www. reuters. com/ article/ uscolombia -economy -taxation -
idUSKCN10N2MG ?il= 0> (last visited 22 March 2017).
105. A proposal has been presented in the final report issued in February
2016 by the Tax Experts Commission (the Commission) ad honorem
appointed by the government to analyse and propose amendments on
tax matters. The final report provides recommendations for the imple-
mentation of a structural tax reform. One recommendation is to intro-
duce ‘income tax on dividends paid to either residents or non-residents
subject to a 20% tax deduction if the dividends are paid out of profits
that were taxed at the level of the company; therefore, if the applicable
income tax rate for a taxpayer is 35%, the effective income tax rate
applicable to dividends would be 15%; if the applicable income tax rate
is 20% or less, the dividend will not be taxed’ ‘Colombia – Tax Experts
Commission’s final report’ (2016).
106. See, e.g. Supreme Court 15 July 1998, No. 31.922, BNB 1998/293, VN
1998/36.4.
107. See, e.g. Supreme Court 29 January 2016, No. 15/00340, V-N
2016/7.17.
We are not aware of any systematic research on this
issue.108 Nor are we aware of systematic comparative
research on the question whether Supreme Courts of
developed and developing countries interpret the rules
of tax treaty non-discrimination provisions in the same
way.
3.2.3 Certainty
Another principle on which developing countries may
have other views than developed countries is legal cer-
tainty in terms of stability, promulgation, non-retroac-
tivity and clarity of laws. Simple legislation for example
is more important, amongst others, due to lack of (suffi-
ciently trained and sufficiently paid) tax administrators
and judges and the lack of administrative guidance, rul-
ings, concepts, etc. Examples of rules that are difficult
to apply for taxpayers, tax administrators and tax judges
in developing countries are the application of transfer
pricing provisions, the application of tax provisions such
as beneficial ownership to prevent tax treaty abuse, and
the exchange of information among tax administrations.
The BEPS Project and BEPS Action Plan ‘brings more
challenges including the development of international
standards to address the digital economy, hybrid mis-
matches, redefinition of the concept of permanent estab-
lishment, and introduction of complex tax treaty abuse
provision such as limitation on benefits among oth-
ers’.109 World Bank president Jim Yong Kim’s call for
developing countries to strive for more reasonable and
predictable tax levels110 also shows developing countries
do not yet have the same perception as developed coun-
tries on the relevance of providing legal certainty to tax-
payers.
3.3 Intermediate Conclusion
Section 3 addressed the question of whether the percep-
tion of fairness between developing countries and devel-
oped countries is the same or different. The description
in Section 3.1 has shown that both the economic and
juridical perceptions of fairness differ between these
countries. Section 3.1 shows that the differences in per-
ception of economic fairness arise due to the fact that
developing countries have a higher dependence on CIT
as source of revenue and on tax incentives as method to
attract investment. In addition, developing countries
and developed countries have different views (i) on level
108. The Jurisprudence Database of the United Nations Human Rights Office
of the High Commissioner; see <http:// juris. ohchr. org/ > (last visited 22
March 2017), gives an overview of cases amongst others on Art. 26
ICCPR.
109. See Valderrama (2015), above n. 7, 615, at 623.
110. Remarks by World Bank President Jim Yong Kim at the Global Connect
Initiative, World Bank–IMF Spring Meetings 2016 in the context of
bridging the ‘digital divide’: more than four billion people without inter-
net access and 90% of them living in developing countries, ‘If we are to
bring these sorts of benefits to all countries – and to achieve SDG tar-
gets – we have to increase our efforts exponentially. Ministers of
Finance can contribute in three ways: First, fair telecom taxation. Gov-
ernments in many developing countries have taxed the ICT sector at
rates significantly higher than other services. Governments need to
ensure more reasonable and predictable tax levels’; see <www.
worldbank. org/ en/ news/ speech/ 2016/ 04/ 14/ remarks -by -world -bank -
group -president -jim -yong -kim -at -the -global -connect -initiative>.
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playing for the digital and the traditional economy; (ii)
on allocation of taxing rights and (iii) on fair tax systems
and fair and efficient tax administrations. These differ-
ences are not only due to the BEPS Projects but also
due to the economic development of a country.
Section 3.2 shows that there are also differences in the
juridical perspective to fairness mainly regarding equali-
ty and certainty. Developed and developing countries
have different views regarding equal treatment to group
of companies. They may also have different views on
the interpretation of non-discrimination provisions in
International Human Right Conventions and tax trea-
ties; and on the importance of the principle of certainty
in drafting tax law and instruments to provide legal cer-
tainty to taxpayers such as rulings.
How to overcome these differences? The following sec-
tion will provide our recommendations to address the
differences in perception.
4 Recommendations
This section aims to answer the question what, if any-
thing, can be done to achieve fairness for both devel-
oped and developing countries? Below we give some –
by no means exhaustive – recommendations.
4.1 Tax Principles, Code of Conduct of Taxation
and Broadening of the BEPS-Agenda
In 1998 the OECD formulated the Ottawa principles of
taxation, which to a high extent reflect Adam Smith
Canons111 and thus an economic perspective: neutrality,
efficiency, certainty and simplicity, flexibility and effec-
tiveness and fairness. The OECD explains the principle
of fairness as: ‘The potential for tax avoidance and eva-
sion should be minimalised while keeping counter-act-
ing measures proportionate to the risks involved.’112
These principles reflect an economic approach to fair-
ness.
For this, Richard Murphy’s Code of Conduct of Taxation
would be a good starting point as the fairness principles
are reflected in this Code. The Code was developed to
favour the interpretation of law according to its purpose
and the intention for which it was implemented. This
Code has fourteen principles of taxation based on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These princi-
ples include, among others, the duty of the state to pro-
tect its citizens, to provide public goods for its citizens,
to refrain from discrimination, etc.113
111. Smith (1904), above n. 90.
112. OECD, ‘Implementation of the Ottawa Framework Conditions The
2003 Report’ (2003); see <www. oecd. org/ tax/ administration/
20499630. pdf> (last visited 22 March 2017); Referred to also in the 5
October 2015 Report OECD, ‘BEPS Action 1 Addressing the Challenges
of the Digital Economy’ (2015); see <www. oecd. org/ tax/ addressing -the
-tax -challenges -of -the -digital -economy -action -1 -2015 -final -report
-9789264241046 -en. htm>, Annex A and Annex C.
113. R. Murphy, ‘A Code of Conduct for Taxation’ (2007); see <www.
taxresearch. org. uk/ Documents/ TaxCodeofConductFinal. pdf> (last vis-
ited 22 March 2017).
We recommend the OECD, IMF, UN and WB (four
IOs) to develop a set of tax principles jointly. One of the
issues that should be addressed in the discussion is the
perspective of the different countries on whether the
social contract theory underlies taxation and if so how
the concept of ‘fair share’ to be paid by the taxpayers
could be made operable in such a way that it offers both
taxpayer and the state sufficient certainty on the amount
of tax to be paid. Academic research may offer some
guidance in this.
We also recommend the four IOs to collectively work on
the follow-up of the OECD’s Report on the impact of
BEPS in Low Income Countries (2014) and the IMF
Policy Paper Spillovers in International Corporate Tax-
ation (2014) and to broaden the scope of the BEPS proj-
ect. Comparative research by academic researchers may
elevate the discussion to a higher level.
In light of the BEPS Agenda, further research should
also be carried out on the practical implementation of
BEPS in developing countries. It is not yet clear what is
the motivation for countries outside the BEPS 44
Group to participate as BEPS Associate and to imple-
ment BEPS. It is also not clear how countries will
implement BEPS including the role of the Legislative,
Executive and Judiciary in the implementation of BEPS,
and whether the implementation of the BEPS Actions
will be compatible with the rules of countries to attract
investment. Nor is it clear how this implementation will
influence the decision to invest by multinationals oper-
ating worldwide.
4.2 Participation of the UN and Joint Work of
the Four IOs
As rightly stated by Dagan, BEPS has centred on
achieving tax revenue rather than on considerations of
justice (Section 2.5). The initiative of the World Bank
and IMF of July 2015 to deepen the dialogue with
developing countries on international tax issues and to
develop tools to help member countries to evaluate and
strengthen their tax policies, as well as OECD’s clear
intention to involve developing countries in the imple-
mentation of the BEPS project is a good step towards
achieving cooperation between states. However, the
authors recommend that this initiative should also
include the UN that has experience in the design of
international tax proposals for developing countries.
At this stage, the role of the UN is limited mainly due to
the rejection by developed countries in the July 2015
Financing for Development Conference of the proposal
to give to the UN Tax Committee the status of inter-
governmental body. The involvement of the UN is nec-
essary to ensure that the initiative of the IMF and
World Bank goes beyond technical assistance, that it
gives a voice to developing countries and that it will
result in concrete proposals for cooperation between
developing and developed countries. Notwithstanding
the acknowledgment by developed countries of the lead-
ing role played by the OECD and the lack of resources
of the UN, we recommend the UN to have a larger role
in the discussion of BEPS with some additional financ-
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ing by the World Bank since this institution has also
addressed the importance of giving a voice to developing
countries in the setting of international tax standards
(Section 2.4.2).
4.3 Revenue Sharing
In the words of Rawls, a proper distribution of benefits
and burdens of social cooperation includes a fair divi-
sion of taxation rights between states.114 The philosoph-
ical approach to fairness aims for citizens to contribute
to society and for multinationals to refrain from using
aggressive tax planning since it will not be fair vis-à-vis
local business and it will reduce compliance from local
business. Mechanisms of sharing of extra revenue that
will be the result of BEPS measures between developing
and developed countries should be included in the agen-
da of the four IOs. In order to address this issue, statis-
tical information on the benefits and costs of BEPS
should be collected either by the four IOs or by academ-
ic researchers. This still open issue will affect how
developing countries perceive the legitimacy of the
BEPS proposals.
The approach to revenue sharing has been made in the
past by one of the authors in respect of exchange of
information stating that ‘exchange of information may
result in more revenue for countries that have the tech-
nological and administrative resources to deal with the
information exchanged. Developing countries will need
an additional motivation to exchange information, and
this could be for instance revenue sharing between
developed and developing countries.’115
An empirical study carried out by Paolini et al. states
that ‘revenue sharing compensates the developing econ-
omy for the loss of tax base, the cost of implementing
tax auditing and (in case of firm relocation) also for the
financial subsidy paid to firms to stay’.116 Therefore,
this study concludes that it is possible for developing
countries to voluntarily sign a tax treaty that includes
exchange of information, tax audit and revenue shar-
ing.117 Furthermore, in the field of administrative assis-
tance, as rightly argued by Turina, it is relevant to
design an incentive-based approach (i.e. revenue shar-
ing) as a policy tool to ensure ex ante compliance with
administrative assistance agreements.118
114. Rawls, justice provides ‘a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic
institutions of society and they define the appropriate distribution of the
benefits and burdens of social cooperation’. A Theory of Justice, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, (1971), at 2; See also J. Rawls, ‘Justice as Fair-
ness’, 67 The Philosophical Review 2, at 178 (1958); J. Rawls, ‘Justice
as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical’, 14 Philosophy & Public Affairs
3, at 223-51 (1985).
115. See Valderrama (2015), above n. 22, 381, at 358.
116. D. Paolini, P. Pistone, G. Pulina & M. Zagler, ‘Tax Treaties with Devel-
oping Countries and the Allocation of Taxing Rights’, 38 European
Journal of Law and Economics 2 (2014).
117. Ibid.
118. A. Turina, ‘Information-Based Administrative Tax-Cooperation, Consoli-
dating Standards, Emerging Actors and Evolutionary Perspectives’ (Doc-
toral Thesis defended at Bocconi University Milan 2013).
4.4 Systematic Research on the Ideas of
Fairness, Equality and Certainty
As mentioned in Section 3.2, developing countries may
have other ideas of equality and certainty than develop-
ing countries. IMF argues rightly that research is nee-
ded on the issue whether all BEPS recommendations are
equally relevant to developing countries. Such research
is indispensable for the political perspective of fairness
and creating legitimacy. Researchers, governments and
international organisation should pay more attention to
what is meant with fairness in general and to differences
in perception between countries more specific in their
discussions on how to prevent tax avoidance and tax
evasion.
For purposes of the design of a global tax system that is
fair and provides both equality and certainty, research
and also a political discussion are indispensable on the
question of what is ‘real economic benefit’ (Fair Tax
Mark119) or ‘the jurisdiction where the true economic
activity occurs’ (Tax Justice120) or ‘the economic activity
undertaken in that country’ (UN121) or ‘the jurisdiction
where profits are generated’ (EU122) or ‘where value is
created’ (OECD BEPS Action 10123).
4.5 Participation on Equal Footing of
Developing Countries
These authors furthermore recommend that by using
the fairness approach, developed countries should
ensure that the needs of developing countries are also
119. Recently the founder of the non-governmental organisation ‘Tax Justice
Network’ Richard Murphy took the initiative for a FairTaxMark for UK
companies. According to the FairTaxMark website, ‘fair tax’ means that
a business seeks to pay the right amount of tax (but no more) in the
right place at the right time; see <www. fairtaxmark. net/ > (last visited
22 March 2017).
120. Tax Justice Network stated in 2014: ‘in a highly globalised world domi-
nated by large multinational corporations, it is essential to ensure that
taxes are paid where the true economic activity occurs. Under current
global rules, this is often not the case, and companies are able to shift
profits around the globe to places where they will be taxed less. This
has a particularly devastating impact on developing countries’. See 17
October 2014; <www. taxjustice. net/ 2014/ 10/ 17/ fair -taxes -key -fair -
share/ > (last visited 22 March 2017).
121. The UN, when explaining BEOS Action 13, stated that the information
provided in the transfer pricing documentation (profits earned and tax
paid, assets owned and number of employees) may be useful for ‘tax
authorities trying to identify whether an MNE is leaving an amount of
income in a jurisdiction that fairly reflects the economic activity under-
taken in that country’, at 16; see <www. un. org/ esa/ ffd/ tax/ BEPS_ note.
pdf> (last visited 22 March 2017).
122. For the EU Commission, companies should pay taxes where profits are
generated and this principle has been undermined by aggressive tax
planning. For the Commission, ‘The majority of businesses do not
engage in aggressive tax planning and suffer a competitive disadvant-
age to those that do. The aggressive behaviour of these companies dis-
torts price signals and allows them to enjoy lower capital costs, disrupt-
ing the level playing field in the Single Market. Small and medium sized
businesses are particularly affected by this phenomenon’. Communica-
tion from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council.
‘Anti-Tax Avoidance Package: Next Steps towards Delivering Effective
Taxation and Greater Transparency in the EU’, COM(2016) 23 final, at
2 (28 January 2016); see <http:// eur -lex. europa. eu/ legal -content/ EN/
TXT/ PDF/ ?uri= CELEX: 52016DC0023& from= EN> (last visited 22 March
2017).
123. OECD, ‘Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation,
Actions 8-10 – 2015 Final Reports’ (2015); see <http:// dx. doi. org/ 10.
1787/ 9789264241244 -en> (last visited 22 March 2017).
46
ELR August 2017 | No. 1 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000077
This article from Erasmus Law Review is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (RUG)
taken into account. IOs including the UN should devel-
op mechanisms to make sure that participation in the
inclusive framework of BEPS Associates is truly on
equal footing and that the outcome of the negotiations of
the BEPS multilateral instrument is transparent by pro-
viding information on what was adopted, and whether
the needs/voice of developing countries were also taken
into account in the final outcome, that is the BEPS mul-
tilateral instrument. Therefore, the authors feel that the
outcome of these meetings – including the agenda, and
the proposals of developed countries, developing coun-
tries and IOs – should be made available on the website
of the OECD. In order for this framework to be truly
inclusive, the agenda should also be inclusive. There-
fore, the discussion should be not only on BEPS issues,
but also on non-BEPS issues that have been identified
as relevant for developing countries. These issues have
been identified in Section 2.1 and are, among others, tax
incentives, tax treaty cost/benefit analysis, introduction
of transfer pricing rules, and the limited administrative
capacity of the tax administration.
Furthermore, the inclusiveness should also result in
more participation of the taxpayer including business
association, tax advisers’ associations, and taxpayers’
associations.124 Till now the participation has been limi-
ted to voluntary participation by these associations in
consultations and in some cases position papers regard-
ing the BEPS Actions.125 Finally, we believe that
BRICS can function as a bridge to reduce the different
perspectives of developed and developing countries on
tax fairness.126
5 Final Remarks
Ostwal raised the question ‘who will adopt the OECD’s
plan against BEPS, after all?’127 In order to get these
plans adopted, it is essential that global fairness will be
achieved for both developing and developed countries.
International organisations play an essential role in
achieving fairness, even if they do not have the same
124. An interesting example of this broader participation is the November
2016 Regional Meeting of the Inclusive Framework of BEPS for African
French-speaking countries. The event was hosted by the Ministry of
Economy and Finance of Tunisia, and organised by the OECD in part-
nership with CREDAF (Centre de rencontres et d’études des dirigeants
des administrations fiscales). The World Bank Group was also represen-
ted. Participants included senior officials from Ministries of Finance and
Tax Administrations from Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, France, Gabon, Guinea, Madagas-
car, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia, as well as business rep-
resentatives (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Cabinet Bile-Aka, Brizoua-Bi et
Associés) and members from civil society such as the BEPS Monitoring
Group and TUAC; see <www. oecd. org/ fr/ fiscalite/ beps/ resume -co -
presidents -reunion -regionale -du -cadre -inclusif -beps -tunis -2016. pdf>.
125. One of the most active participants regarding BEPS has been the Busi-
ness and Industry Advisory Committee; see <http:// biac. org/ focus -
areas/ international -taxation/ > (last visited 22 March 2017).
126. The impact of the BRICS on the international tax regime has been thor-
oughly analysed in Y. Brauner and P. Pistone (eds.), ‘BRICS and the
Emergence of International Tax Coordination’, IBFD (2015).
127. Ostwal, above n. 35.
powers as legislators. We recall Nagel’s quotes on this
presented in Section 2.5: ‘global justice requires global
sovereignty’ and ‘the most likely path toward some ver-
sion of global justice is through the creation of potential-
ly unjust and illegitimate global structures of power that
are tolerable to the interests of the most powerful cur-
rent nation-states’.
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